CASE

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Case Name

Oncu v. Oncu, 2009 BCSC 829

INCADAT reference

HC/E/CA 1112

Court

Country

CANADA

Name

British Columbia Supreme Court

Level

First Instance

Judge(s)
C.J. Bruce J.

States involved

Requesting State

TURKEY

Requested State

CANADA

Decision

Date

22 June 2009

Status

Final

Grounds

Habitual Residence - Art. 3 | Consent - Art. 13(1)(a) | Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)

Order

Return ordered

HC article(s) Considered

3 5 12 13(1)(a) 13(1)(b) 13(2) 16

HC article(s) Relied Upon

3 12 13(1)(a) 13(1)(b)

Other provisions

-

Authorities | Cases referred to
Chan v. Chow, 2001 BCCA 276 [Chan]; D.(Z.) v. Z(J.) (1994), 99 B.C.L.R. (2d) 287 (S.C.); Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, s. 55; Fasiang v. Fasiangova, 2008 BCSC 1339; Garelli v. Rahmaj (2006), 28 R.F.L. (6th) 455 (Ont. S.C.J.); Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigiannis, [2001] O.J. No. 1598 (Ont. C.A.); Kirby v. Thuns (2008), 59 R.F.L. (6th) 403 (Ont. S.C.J.); O'Brien v. O'Brien (2008), 59 R.F.L. (6th) 389 (Ont. S.C.J.); P. V. P. (Abduction: Consent or Acquiescence), [1997] 3 F.C.R. 550 (H.C. Fam. Div.), aff'd March 6, 1998 (C.A.); Re J. (A minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights), [1990] A.C. 562 (H.L.); R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, [1983] A.C. 309 (H.L.); Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 SCR 551.

INCADAT comment

Aims & Scope of the Convention

Habitual Residence
Habitual Residence

SUMMARY

Summary available in EN

Facts

The child, a girl, was born in August 2000 in Canada. In February 2006 the mother moved with the child to Turkey. Both parents held dual Canadian / Turkish citizenship. The father remained in Canada. In May 2007 the father travelled to Turkey with the intention of residing there permanently with the mother and child, who by this point was enrolled in school.

Marital troubles arose and by September 2007 the parties were no longer living together. In April 2008 the father returned with the child to Canada. The mother applied for an order under the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention for the return of the child to Turkey. The parties disputed whether the mother had consented to the child's removal to Canada.

Ruling

Removal wrongful and return ordered, with the father ordered to pay the costs of return; the child was habitually resident in Turkey at the time of her removal and none of the exceptions had been established to the standard required under the Convention.

Grounds

Habitual Residence - Art. 3

The Court noted that the child had been in Turkey for an appreciable period of time when taken to Canada by the father. When she had travelled to Turkey, her mother clearly had a settled intention to reside in that country.

As regards the father, the Court found that notwithstanding his assertions the latter trip was merely for a vacation, by the time of the return to Canada he had by his actions acquiesced in the change of her habitual residence from Canada to Turkey.

Consent - Art. 13(1)(a)


The parents disagreed as to whether the mother had consented to the child moving to Canada. The Court found that the father had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the mother had consented to the relocation.

Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)


The Court rejected the father's assertions that the child would be subjected to grave psychological harm if returned to Turkey in the light of the strict cultural expectations which existed in that State.

INCADAT comment

Habitual Residence

The interpretation of the central concept of habitual residence (Preamble, Art. 3, Art. 4) has proved increasingly problematic in recent years with divergent interpretations emerging in different jurisdictions. There is a lack of uniformity as to whether in determining habitual residence the emphasis should be exclusively on the child, with regard paid to the intentions of the child's care givers, or primarily on the intentions of the care givers. At least partly as a result, habitual residence may appear a very flexible connecting factor in some Contracting States yet much more rigid and reflective of long term residence in others.

Any assessment of the interpretation of habitual residence is further complicated by the fact that cases focusing on the concept may concern very different factual situations. For example habitual residence may arise for consideration following a permanent relocation, or a more tentative move, albeit one which is open-ended or potentially open-ended, or indeed the move may be for a clearly defined period of time.

General Trends:

United States Federal Appellate case law may be taken as an example of the full range of interpretations which exist with regard to habitual residence.

Child Centred Focus

The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit has advocated strongly for a child centred approach in the determination of habitual residence:

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 125 ALR Fed. 703 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 142]

Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/US 935].

See also:

Villalta v. Massie, No. 4:99cv312-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 1999) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 221].

Combined Child's Connection / Parental Intention Focus

The United States Courts of Appeals for the 3rd and 8th Circuits, have espoused a child centred approach but with reference equally paid to the parents' present shared intentions.

The key judgment is that of Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 83].

See also:

Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 530];

Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 879].

In the latter case a distinction was drawn between the situation of very young children, where particular weight was placed on parental intention(see for example: Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 808]) and that of older children where the impact of parental intention was more limited.

Parental Intention Focus

The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 301] has been highly influential in providing that there should ordinarily be a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence before a child can acquire a new one.

This interpretation has been endorsed and built upon in other Federal appellate decisions so that where there was not a shared intention on the part of the parents as to the purpose of the move this led to an existing habitual residence being retained, even though the child had been away from that jurisdiction for an extended period of time. See for example:

Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 777]: United States habitual residence retained after 8 months of an intended 4 year stay in Germany;

Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 780]: United States habitual residence retained during 32 month stay in Mexico;

Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp.2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 482]: United States habitual residence retained during 27 month stay in Greece.

The Mozes approach has also been approved of by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd and 7th Circuits:

Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 776];

Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (2006 7th Cir.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 878].

It should be noted that within the Mozes approach the 9th Circuit did acknowledge that given enough time and positive experience, a child's life could become so firmly embedded in the new country as to make it habitually resident there notwithstanding lingering parental intentions to the contrary.

Other Jurisdictions

There are variations of approach in other jurisdictions:

Austria
The Supreme Court of Austria has ruled that a period of residence of more than six months in a State will ordinarily be characterized as habitual residence, and even if it takes place against the will of the custodian of the child (since it concerns a factual determination of the centre of life).

8Ob121/03g, Oberster Gerichtshof [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/AT 548].

Canada
In the Province of Quebec, a child centred focus is adopted:

In Droit de la famille 3713, No 500-09-010031-003 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 651], the Cour d'appel de Montréal held that the determination of the habitual residence of a child was a purely factual issue to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case with regard to the reality of the child's life, rather than that of his parents. The actual period of residence must have endured for a continuous and not insignificant period of time; the child must have a real and active link to the place, but there is no minimum period of residence which is specified.

Germany
A child centred, factual approach is also evident in German case law:

2 UF 115/02, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 944].

This has led to the Federal Constitutional Court accepting that a habitual residence may be acquired notwithstanding the child having been wrongfully removed to the new State of residence:

Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1206/98, 29. Oktober 1998  [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 233].

The Constitutional Court upheld the finding of the Higher Regional Court that the children had acquired a habitual residence in France, notwithstanding the nature of their removal there. This was because habitual residence was a factual concept and during their nine months there, the children had become integrated into the local environment.

Israel
Alternative approaches have been adopted when determining the habitual residence of children. On occasion, strong emphasis has been placed on parental intentions. See:

Family Appeal 1026/05 Ploni v. Almonit [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 865];

Family Application 042721/06 G.K. v Y.K. [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 939].

However, reference has been made to a more child centred approach in other cases. See:

decision of the Supreme Court in C.A. 7206/03, Gabai v. Gabai, P.D. 51(2)241;

FamA 130/08 H v H [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 922].

New Zealand
In contrast to the Mozes approach the requirement of a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence was specifically rejected by a majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. See

S.K. v. K.P. [2005] 3 NZLR 590 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NZ 816].

Switzerland
A child centred, factual approach is evident in Swiss case law:

5P.367/2005/ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CH 841].

United Kingdom
The standard approach is to consider the settled intention of the child's carers in conjunction with the factual reality of the child's life.

Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 2]. For academic commentary on the different models of interpretation given to habitual residence. See:

R. Schuz, "Habitual Residence of Children under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: Theory and Practice", Child and Family Law Quarterly Vol 13, No. 1, 2001, p. 1;

R. Schuz, "Policy Considerations in Determining Habitual Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context", Journal of Transnational Law and Policy Vol. 11, 2001, p. 101.