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This decision constitutes the third-instance stage of proceedings arising from the wrongful retention in Israel of a child (born in Ireland in 2020). The background facts were set out in detail in the Supreme Court's prior decision of 4 December 2025 (CA Application 73034-11-25, Justice Y. Willner, INCADAT Case No. 1755).

The parents, an Israeli woman (holding Israeli, British and Irish citizenships) and an Irish Catholic man (citizen and resident of Ireland), met in Israel in 2014 and subsequently relocated together to Dublin, Ireland. They were married in September 2017 and had a child, born in Dublin, in September 2020.

In June 2025 the mother took the child to Israel without the knowledge or consent of the father. 

On 19 October 2025, the first instance court (Family Court, Petah Tikva, Hon. Senior Judge R. Makayes, FC 66078-07-25, 19 October 2025) ordered the return of the child to Ireland but imposed conditions on the return, including that the child be returned to Dublin (not to Kenmare where the parties had last resided), enrolled in a non-denominational school, and that the mother be permitted to travel to England with the child three times per year during Jewish holidays. Financial guarantees were also required from both parties.

On 19 November 2025, the District Court upheld the first instance decision ordering the return of the child but set aside the requirement that the Child be returned specifically to Dublin.

The mother applied to the Supreme Court. 

Application for leave to appeal dismissed. Return to Ireland upheld.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application without requesting a response, pursuant to Regulation 148a of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779–2018. The application did not meet the threshold for the grant of leave in third-round proceedings: it raised no principled legal question transcending the parties' individual interests and there was no concern of a miscarriage of justice. The Court further noted that the District Court's judgment faithfully upheld the guiding principle of zero tolerance toward child abduction and the "first aid" rule that form the foundation of the Hague Convention and Israeli Hague Convention Law. The application for a stay of execution was also dismissed. No order as to costs.

Non-Convention Issues

The Court reaffirmed the established rule that leave to appeal in a "third round" of proceedings will be granted only in exceptional cases where either: (a) a principled legal question arises that goes beyond the parties' individual interests; or (b) there is a concern of a miscarriage of justice. The Court confirmed that this standard applies, with necessary adaptations, to proceedings under the Hague Convention Law given their significance for the lives of minors, but stressed that this does not mean leave will be automatically granted in matters involving parents and children.

The Court found that the District Court's rulings were grounded in the specific facts of the case and raised no principled legal question of the type warranting examination in third-round leave proceedings. The fact that the District Court, sitting as an appellate court, had reached a different outcome than the Family Court below did not, in itself, constitute grounds for granting leave.

The Court held that granting leave was not required to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the District Court's decision upheld the core principle of zero tolerance toward child abduction and the "first aid" rule — the principle that a child wrongfully removed from their habitual residence must be returned promptly so that questions of custody and welfare may be resolved by the courts of the country of habitual residence. The Court referenced Justice Stein's earlier detailed treatment of these principles in CA Application 7918/21.