INCADAT | Central Authority v. Reynders and Another (12856/2010) [2010] ZAGPPHC 193; 2011 (2) SA 428 (GNP); [2011] 2 All SA 438 (GNP)

Aims of the Convention - Preamble, Arts 1 and 2

The trial judge noted that the main purpose of the Hague Convention was to restore the status quo as soon as possible to what it was prior to the unlawful removal.

Habitual Residence - Art. 3
The maternal grandmother opposed the return application in the first instance on the basis that the child was not habitually resident in California. The trial judge noted statements from the father, a director of photography in the film industry, that his official domicile, and that of his daughter, had been and remained in Belgium.

However, their place of habitual residence was in Los Angeles. The father explained that his reason for applying to the American Central Authority was that he wished to have his daughter returned to the United States of America where all her current social ties lay. It was also the place where she went to school and had all her friends.

The trial judge noted that habitual residence was not defined in the Convention. He held that the word "habitual" implied a stable territorial link, which might be achieved through length of stay, or through evidence of a particularly close tie between the person and the place.

When a child was removed from its habitual environment, the implication was that it was being removed from the family and social environment in which its life had developed.

The trial judge concluded that the family's residence in Los Angeles was at the best of a temporary nature given the father's profession and its uncertainties. There was no convincing evidence that either father or daughter had a particularly close tie with either Los Angeles or the United States.

They seemed to have moved there merely as a matter of convenience, and there was no indication on the evidence that their residence there would be of some permanence, or even that the father had any intention at all of changing his domicile from Belgium to the United States.

The father had brought legal proceedings in Belgium which were pending, and all the allegations he had made in those proceedings, as in the present proceedings, pointed to the fact that his own closest ties were with Belgium, that he regarded himself and his daughter as being domiciled there, and there had been no allegation pointing to the fact of his intention to abandon that.

The trial judge thereby held that the father had not discharged the onus of proving that the child was habitually resident in the United States immediately before any breach of custody rights.

Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)
The trial judge rejected arguments based on grave risk of harm. He held that the psychological harm the child would experience would not be the serious harm contemplated by Article 13, but the type of harm all children who had been abducted and ordered to return, were likely to suffer.

Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)
The trial judge noted that in accordance with section 278(3) of the Children's Act 2005, the Court had to, in considering an application for the return of a child, afford the child the opportunity to raise an objection to being returned, and in so doing must give due weight to that objection, taking into account the age and maturity of the child.

Furthermore, under section 279 there was a requirement for the legal representation of a child under such circumstances. He further noted that he was also required to abide by section 28 of the South African Constitution whereby a child's best interests were of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child, although he equally acknowledged that he was not sitting as a Court in custody proceedings.

The trial judge noted that the child had an ambivalent attitude towards the father and his way of life, though he recognized that the child's views were not entirely objective. He ultimately concluded that it was in the child's best interests that the return application be refused.

Procedural Matters
Notwithstanding that she successfully defended the return application, the trial judge ordered that the maternal grandmother pay the costs of the proceedings. This was because of her actions in retaining the child and then in bringing her ex parte application which was not done in good faith.

Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy

Habitual Residence - Art. 3

Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)

Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)

Procedural Matters

Habitual Residence

The interpretation of the central concept of habitual residence (Preamble, Art. 3, Art. 4) has proved increasingly problematic in recent years with divergent interpretations emerging in different jurisdictions. There is a lack of uniformity as to whether in determining habitual residence the emphasis should be exclusively on the child, with regard paid to the intentions of the child's care givers, or primarily on the intentions of the care givers. At least partly as a result, habitual residence may appear a very flexible connecting factor in some Contracting States yet much more rigid and reflective of long term residence in others.

Any assessment of the interpretation of habitual residence is further complicated by the fact that cases focusing on the concept may concern very different factual situations. For example habitual residence may arise for consideration following a permanent relocation, or a more tentative move, albeit one which is open-ended or potentially open-ended, or indeed the move may be for a clearly defined period of time.

General Trends:

United States Federal Appellate case law may be taken as an example of the full range of interpretations which exist with regard to habitual residence.

Child Centred Focus

The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit has advocated strongly for a child centred approach in the determination of habitual residence:

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 125 ALR Fed. 703 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 142]

Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/US 935].

See also:

Villalta v. Massie, No. 4:99cv312-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 1999) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 221].

Combined Child's Connection / Parental Intention Focus

The United States Courts of Appeals for the 3rd and 8th Circuits, have espoused a child centred approach but with reference equally paid to the parents' present shared intentions.

The key judgment is that of Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 83].

See also:

Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 530];

Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 879].

In the latter case a distinction was drawn between the situation of very young children, where particular weight was placed on parental intention(see for example: Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 808]) and that of older children where the impact of parental intention was more limited.

Parental Intention Focus

The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 301] has been highly influential in providing that there should ordinarily be a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence before a child can acquire a new one.

This interpretation has been endorsed and built upon in other Federal appellate decisions so that where there was not a shared intention on the part of the parents as to the purpose of the move this led to an existing habitual residence being retained, even though the child had been away from that jurisdiction for an extended period of time. See for example:

Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 777]: United States habitual residence retained after 8 months of an intended 4 year stay in Germany;

Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 780]: United States habitual residence retained during 32 month stay in Mexico;

Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp.2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 482]: United States habitual residence retained during 27 month stay in Greece.

The Mozes approach has also been approved of by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd and 7th Circuits:

Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 776];

Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (2006 7th Cir.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 878].

It should be noted that within the Mozes approach the 9th Circuit did acknowledge that given enough time and positive experience, a child's life could become so firmly embedded in the new country as to make it habitually resident there notwithstanding lingering parental intentions to the contrary.

Other Jurisdictions

There are variations of approach in other jurisdictions:

Austria
The Supreme Court of Austria has ruled that a period of residence of more than six months in a State will ordinarily be characterized as habitual residence, and even if it takes place against the will of the custodian of the child (since it concerns a factual determination of the centre of life).

8Ob121/03g, Oberster Gerichtshof [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/AT 548].

Canada
In the Province of Quebec, a child centred focus is adopted:

In Droit de la famille 3713, No 500-09-010031-003 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 651], the Cour d'appel de Montréal held that the determination of the habitual residence of a child was a purely factual issue to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case with regard to the reality of the child's life, rather than that of his parents. The actual period of residence must have endured for a continuous and not insignificant period of time; the child must have a real and active link to the place, but there is no minimum period of residence which is specified.

Germany
A child centred, factual approach is also evident in German case law:

2 UF 115/02, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 944].

This has led to the Federal Constitutional Court accepting that a habitual residence may be acquired notwithstanding the child having been wrongfully removed to the new State of residence:

Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1206/98, 29. Oktober 1998 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 233].

The Constitutional Court upheld the finding of the Higher Regional Court that the children had acquired a habitual residence in France, notwithstanding the nature of their removal there. This was because habitual residence was a factual concept and during their nine months there, the children had become integrated into the local environment.

Israel
Alternative approaches have been adopted when determining the habitual residence of children. On occasion, strong emphasis has been placed on parental intentions. See:

Family Appeal 1026/05 Ploni v. Almonit [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 865];

Family Application 042721/06 G.K. v Y.K. [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 939].

However, reference has been made to a more child centred approach in other cases. See:

decision of the Supreme Court in C.A. 7206/03, Gabai v. Gabai, P.D. 51(2)241;

FamA 130/08 H v H [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 922].

New Zealand
In contrast to the Mozes approach the requirement of a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence was specifically rejected by a majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. See

S.K. v. K.P. [2005] 3 NZLR 590 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NZ 816].

Switzerland
A child centred, factual approach is evident in Swiss case law:

5P.367/2005/ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CH 841].

United Kingdom
The standard approach is to consider the settled intention of the child's carers in conjunction with the factual reality of the child's life.

Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 2]. For academic commentary on the different models of interpretation given to habitual residence. See:

R. Schuz, "Habitual Residence of Children under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: Theory and Practice", Child and Family Law Quarterly Vol 13, No. 1, 2001, p. 1;

R. Schuz, "Policy Considerations in Determining Habitual Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context", Journal of Transnational Law and Policy Vol. 11, 2001, p. 101.

Relocations

Where there is clear evidence of an intention to commence a new life in another State then the existing habitual residence will be lost and a new one acquired.

In common law jurisdictions it is accepted that acquisition may be able to occur within a short period of time, see:

Canada
DeHaan v. Gracia [2004] AJ No.94 (QL), [2004] ABQD 4, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 576];

United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 2];

Re F. (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 40].

In civil law jurisdictions it has been held that a new habitual residence may be acquired immediately, see:

Switzerland
Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile) Décision du 15 novembre 2005, 5P.367/2005 /ast, [INCADAT cite : HC/E/CH 841].

Conditional Relocations

Where parental agreement as regards relocation is conditional on a future event, should an existing habitual residence be lost immediately upon leaving that country?

Australia
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia answered this question in the negative and further held that loss may not even follow from the fulfilment of the condition if the parent who aspires to relocate does not clearly commit to the relocation at that time, see:

Kilah & Director-General, Department of Community Services [2008] FamCAFC 81, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 995].

However, this ruling was overturned on appeal by the High Court of Australia, which held that an existing habitual residence would be lost if the purpose had a sufficient degree of continuity to be described as settled. There did not need to be a settled intention to take up ‘long term' residence:

L.K. v. Director-General Department of Community Services [2009] HCA 9, (2009) 253 ALR 202, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 1012].

Open-Ended Moves

Where a move is open ended, or potentially open ended, the habitual residence at the time of the move may also be lost and a new one acquired relatively quickly, see:

United Kingdom - England and Wales (Non-Convention case)
Al Habtoor v. Fotheringham [2001] EWCA Civ 186, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 875];

New Zealand
Callaghan v. Thomas [2001] NZFLR 1105 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 413];

United Kingdom - Scotland
Cameron v. Cameron 1996 SC 17, 1996 SLT 306, 1996 SCLR 25 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 71];

Moran v. Moran 1997 SLT 541 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 74];

United States of America
Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 879].

Separate Representation

There is a lack of uniformity in English speaking jurisdictions with regard to separate representation for children.

United Kingdom - England & Wales
An early appellate judgment established that in keeping with the summary nature of Convention proceedings, separate representation should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances.

Re M. (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1994] 1 FLR 390 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 56].

Reaffirmed by:

Re H. (A Child: Child Abduction) [2006] EWCA Civ 1247, [2007] 1 FLR 242 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 881];

Re F. (Abduction: Joinder of Child as Party) [2007] EWCA Civ 393, [2007] 2 FLR 313, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 905].

The exceptional circumstances standard has been established in several cases, see:

Re M. (A Minor) (Abduction: Child's Objections) [1994] 2 FLR 126 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 57];

Re S. (Abduction: Children: Separate Representation) [1997] 1 FLR 486 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 180];

Re H.B. (Abduction: Children's Objections) (No. 2) [1998] 1 FLR 564 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 168];

Re J. (Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2004] EWCA CIV 428, [2004] 2 FLR 64 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 579];

Vigreux v. Michel [2006] EWCA Civ 630, [2006] 2 FLR 1180 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 829];

Nyachowe v. Fielder [2007] EWCA Civ 1129, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 964].

In Re H. (A Child) [2006] EWCA Civ 1247, [2007] 1 FLR 242, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 881] it was suggested by Thorpe L.J. that the bar had been raised by the Brussels II a Regulation insofar as applications for party status were concerned.

This suggestion was rejected by Baroness Hale in:

Re D. (A Child) (Abduction: Foreign Custody Rights) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 A.C. 619 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 880]. Without departing from the exceptional circumstances test, she signalled the need, in the light of the new Community child abduction regime, for a re-appraisal of the way in which the views of abducted children were to be ascertained. In particular she argued for views to be sought at the outset of proceedings to avoid delays.

In Re F. (Abduction: Joinder of Child as Party) [2007] EWCA Civ 393, [2007] 2 FLR 313, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 905] Thorpe L.J. acknowledged that the bar had not been raised in applications for party status. He rejected the suggestion that the bar had been lowered by the House of Lords in Re D.

However, in Re M. (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 937] Baroness Hale again intervened in the debate and affirmed that a directions judge should evaluate whether separate representation would add enough to the Court's understanding of the issues to justify the resultant intrusion, delay and expense which would follow. This would suggest a more flexible test, however, she also added that children should not be given an exaggerated impression of the relevance and importance of their views and in the general run of cases party status would not be accorded.

Australia
Australia's supreme jurisdiction sought to break from an exceptional circumstances test in De L. v. Director General, New South Wales Department of Community Services and Another, (1996) 20 Fam LR 390 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 93].

However, the test was reinstated by the legislator in the Family Law Amendment Act 2000, see: Family Law Act 1975, s. 68L.

See:
State Central Authority & Quang [2009] FamCA 1038, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 1106].

France
Children heard under Art 13(2) can be assisted by a lawyer (art 338-5 NCPC and art 388-1 Code Civil - the latter article specifies however that children so assisted are not conferred the status of a party to the proceedings), see:

Cass Civ 1ère 17 Octobre 2007, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/FR 946];

Cass. Civ 1ère 14/02/2006, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/FR 853].

In Scotland & New Zealand there has been a much greater willingness to allow children separate representation, see for example:

United Kingdom - Scotland
C. v. C. [2008] CSOH 42, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 962];

M. Petitioner 2005 SLT 2 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 804];

W. v. W. 2003 SLT 1253 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 508];

New Zealand
K.S v.L.S [2003] 3 NZLR 837 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 770];

B. v. C., 24 December 2001, High Court at Christchurch (New Zealand) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 532].

Costs

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Case Law Search

CASE

Case Name

Central Authority v. Reynders and Another (12856/2010) [2010] ZAGPPHC 193; 2011 (2) SA 428 (GNP); [2011] 2 All SA 438 (GNP)

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