CASO

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Nombre del caso

Blaga v. Romania (Application No 54443/10)

Referencia INCADAT

HC/E/RO 1274

Tribunal

Instancia

Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH)

Estados involucrados

Estado requirente

Estados Unidos de América

Estado requerido

Rumania

Fallo

Fecha

1 July 2014

Estado

Sujeto a apelación

Fundamentos

Objeciones del niño a la restitución - art. 13(2) | Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH) | Cuestiones procesales

Fallo

-

Artículo(s) del Convenio considerados

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Artículo(s) del Convenio invocados en la decisión

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Otras disposiciones
Artículos 8 y 41 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos
Jurisprudencia | Casos referidos

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INCADAT comentario

Interrelación con instrumentos internacionales y regionales y Derecho interno

Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)
Fallos del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH)

Excepciones a la restitución

Protección de derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales
Protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales
Oposición del menor
Edad y grado de madurez requeridos

SUMARIO

Sumario disponible en EN | FR | ES

Facts

The proceedings related to three children, all of whom had dual American and Romanian citizenship, who were born in March 1998 and October 2000 (twins). The parents, who had married and lived in the United States, also held dual Romanian-U.S. citizenship.

On 1 May 2007, the Superior Court of Forsyth County in the United States of America issued an injunction forbidding the parents from removing their children or settling outside the jurisdiction of the said court without its express permission.

On 14 August 2008, the father signed a notarised form authorising the mother to take the children for a short holiday to Romania. However, the mother failed to return the children and on 14 October 2008, she instituted divorce and custody proceedings before the Braşov District Court in Romania.

On 19 December 2008, the father filed for divorce and custody in the Superior Court of Forsyth County. This application was ultimately dismissed (including an appeal) for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction.

On 11 December 2008, the U.S. Central Authority submitted a return request to the Romanian Ministry of Justice.

On 12 December 2008, the Romanian Ministry of Justice contacted the mother, and asked her to express her position on a potential friendly settlement of the case and voluntary return of the children.

On 4 February 2009, the Romanian Ministry of Justice, acting as the Central Authority, instituted proceedings on behalf of the father, who was represented by a lawyer of his choosing, before the Bucharest County Court.

On 16 April 2009, the Bucharest County Court dismissed the father's action on the basis of testimonial and documentary evidence, a social inquiry report produced by the Braşov Guardianship Authority, and the children's testimonies. The retention was found to have been wrongful and whilst an argument under Art. 13(1) b) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention was dismissed, the court declined to make a return order on the basis of the objections of the children.

On 24 June 2009, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the father's appeal on points of law, quashed the judgment of 16 April 2009, and ordered a retrial.

On 24 November 2009, following a second set of proceedings, the Bucharest County Court dismissed the father's action, again on the basis of the children's objections.

On 25 March 2010, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the father's appeal on points of law.

The father lodged an application (No 54443/10) against Romania with the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR) on 20 September 2010, in which he alleged that the unfolding, outcome and de facto consequences of the proceedings under Art. 3 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention had breached his rights guaranteed, inter alia, by Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition, he alleged that the length of the divorce-and-custody proceedings, which had been instituted against him by the mother, had breached his rights guaranteed by Art. 6 of the ECHR.

Ruling

By a majority ruling (5:2) the ECrtHR found there to have been a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR and, in a unanimous ruling, that there had been a violation of Art. 6 of the ECHR.

Grounds

Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)


The Court recalled that it had already held that within the legal framework set up by the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and Brussels IIa Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003), "if the children's opinions [were] be taken into account, their opposition was not necessarily an obstacle to their return" (see Raw v. France, No. 10131/11, § 94, 7 March 2013 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/ 1271]).
 
When assessing an application for a child's return, Council of Europe Member State courts must not only consider arguable objections to the child's return, but must also make a ruling giving specific reasons in the light of the circumstances of the case. Both a refusal to take account of objections to the return capable of falling within the scope of Arts 12, 13 and 20 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and insufficient reasoning in the ruling dismissing or accepting such objections would be contrary to the requirements of Art. 8 of the ECHR and also to the aim and purpose of the Hague Convention. Recalling the Grand Chamber ruling in X v. Latvia [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/ 1234], the Court held that "[d]ue consideration of such allegations, demonstrated by reasoning of the domestic courts that [was] not automatic and stereotyped, but sufficiently detailed in the light of the exceptions set out in the Hague Convention, which must be interpreted strictly, [was] necessary".

While, the Court underlined its concern with the fact that only one of the children had been over ten years old when heard, and had met the minimum lawful age requirement for her opinion to be heard by the Romanian courts, it was prepared to accept that the conditions for the domestic courts to be able to rely on Art. 13(2) of the Hague Convention had been met.
The Court noted that the objections of the children were decisive in the decision of the domestic courts to refuse their return to the State of their habitual residence. After referring to the text of the Hague Convention and the Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report, the Court considered that "while the [Hague] Convention recognize[d] that the objecting child should have a voice, it [did] not consider that voice to amount to a veto in the process of deciding whether he or she [would] be returned".

The Court noted that the Romanian courts had also examined other aspects of the children's circumstances. However, it was not entirely convinced that the Romanian courts "had sufficiently balanced the [father]'s interest of a right to family life against the competing interest of the other parties in the case and therefore had sufficiently protected the best interest of the children as defined in the light of the Hague Convention principles".

In particular, the last instance court gave no express consideration to the issue of whether the children could quickly re-adapt to a return in the United States of America. Moreover, it did not appear that the Romanian courts had attempted to examine if it would have been possible for the children to return to the United States of America accompanied by their mother and whether arrangements could have been made within the legal framework of the State of habitual residence or following agreements with the father for them to live together, separately from their father pending the outcome of divorce and custody proceedings, and consequently whether such arrangements would have alleviated the serious risks mentioned by the Romanian court of last instance. The Court noted that such considerations were even more relevant as neither the psychological evaluation report nor the social investigation report had directly addressed the question of the children's return or stated that it would be in any way harmful if they were to return to the United States of America accompanied by their mother and lived separately from their father.

The Court recalled that the interests of the child were paramount in abduction cases. Thus it may well have been justified, more than thirteen months after the removal for the Romanian courts to hold that the family situation they had been familiar with at the time of the departure had changed, and that it was in their best interests to remain in Romania with their mother. However, for the Court to accept that a change in the relevant facts may exceptionally justify such a decision, it had to be satisfied "that the change was not brought about by the State's actions or inactions". In the present case the 13 months it took for the Romanian courts to adopt the final decision failed to meet the urgency of the situation, consequently the Court considered that the change in the children's circumstances was also considerably influenced by the slow reaction of the authorities.

For these reasons, the Court considered that the father had suffered a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his family life, in that the decision-making process under domestic law did not satisfy the procedural requirements inherent in Art. 8 of the ECHR. Therefore, there had been a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR.

Dissenting Opinion:
Judge López Guerra, with whom judge Motoc joined, dissented from the Chamber's opinion concerning a violation of Art. 8. The dissent held that the Chamber's reasoning and final decision on the issue dealt with matters "which should be left to the consideration of the domestic courts, which were in a much better position to assess directly the individual characteristics of this case". From a substantive point of view, the ECrtHR Chamber was not in a position to criticize the Romanian courts' interpretation and application of Art. 13(2) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention in this case. The reasoning of both the County Court and the Court of Appeal was extended and detailed and explicitly assessed the credibility and reliability of the children's testimony, given their youth. The ECrtHR Chamber, without having any direct means to assess the circumstances and testimonies of the children and parties, could not substitute its own opinion for the decisions of the courts which had examined the case, furthermore declaring that it was "not entirely convinced that the domestic courts had sufficiently balanced the applicant's interests of a right to family life against the competing interests of the other parties [to] the case". The dissent held that on the contrary, the facts of the case showed that the Romanian courts had indeed carefully assessed the balance of interests at stake. Their determination of what constituted the best interest of the children could not be deemed to be "unsatisfactory". Furthermore, the dissent did not accept the second reason given in the Chamber's judgment to support its finding of a violation of Art. 8, namely the duration of the proceedings. The dissent held that the time taken did not violate Art. 8 of the ECHR; the Romanian Courts had acted with the required rigour and expedience, and had thus fulfilled their Art. 8 obligations.

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

Art. 8 of the ECHR:
The father complained that the Romanian courts:

  • had misinterpreted the provisions of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and had relied exclusively on the opinion of his children to deny him their return to the United States of America;
  • had failed to provide sufficient reasons for ignoring the injunctions delivered by the U.S. courts and the documents submitted by the U.S. authorities;
  • had failed to expedite the proceedings, which had prevented him from exercising his parental rights as the children had remained under their mother's control;
  • and by unlawfully transferring the de facto jurisdiction on custody matters, the Romanian courts had discriminated against him and placed him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his wife.
(See also above "Art. 13(2)" as regards the inter-relationship of the latter provision and Art. 8 of the ECHR).

The Court held that the dismissal of the father's return application constituted an interference with his right to respect for family life. However, as the interference was provided for by law, it had to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Art. 8(2) of the ECHR. When striking a balance between the competing interests at stake, it had to be determined whether the Romanian authorities had "acted swiftly and appropriate consideration [had been] given to the children's best interests, within the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in such matters".

The Court noted that, as the Preamble to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention provided for children's return "to the State of their habitual residence", Council of Europe Member State courts must satisfy themselves that adequate safeguards were convincingly provided in that country, and, in the event of a known risk, that tangible protection measures were put in place.

Furthermore, in matters pertaining to the reunification of children with their parents, the adequacy of a measure was also to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, such cases required urgent handling, as the passage of time could have irremediable consequences for the relations between the children and the absent parent.

The Court noted that a period of more than thirteen months elapsed from the date on which the father lodged his return request to that on which the final decision was taken. It considered that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously, manifestly in breach of the applicable law.

Judge López Guerra, with whom judge Motoc joined, dissented from the Chamber's opinion concerning a violation of Art. 8, see above under "Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)".

Art. 6 of the ECHR:
The Court noted that the divorce and custody proceedings instituted by the mother in Romania lasted from 14 October 2008 to 12 March 2014. Consequently, a period of five years and five months for three levels of jurisdiction. The Court unanimously considered that there had been repeated procedural delays over the entire course of the proceedings and found that the length of the proceedings did not satisfy the "reasonable time" requirement. There had accordingly been a breach of Art. 6 § 1 of the ECHR.

Procedural Matters

The father was awarded 9,750 Euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 8,000 Euros in respect of costs and expenses.

Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy

INCADAT comment

European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR) Judgments

Protection of Human rights & Fundamental Freedoms

Preparation of INCADAT commentary in progress.

Requisite Age and Degree of Maturity

Article 13(2) does not include a minimum age from which the objections of a child must be ascertained, rather it employs the formula that the child must have ‘attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.'  Nevertheless it was the intention of the drafters that the exception would be primarily directed towards teenagers who were not prepared to go back to their home State.

Undoubtedly influenced by domestic family law practice, different patterns emerged in Contracting States as to the manner in which this exception has been applied.  Moreover those patterns may have evolved in jurisdictions during the life span of the application of the Convention, particularly as greater recognition has been paid to children as legal actors in their own right.  Indeed in the European Union, at least as regards intra-EU abductions, there is now an obligation that a child is given an opportunity to be heard, unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his age or maturity: Council Regulation 2201/2003, Art. 11(2).

The issue of age and maturity is also closely inter-related with the threshold applied to the exception, that is to say the criteria used to determine the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to take a child's objections into account, see for example: Re T. (Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2000] 2 FLR 192 [INCADAT cite HC/E/UKe 270]; Zaffino v. Zaffino [2006] 1 FLR 410 [INCADAT cite HC/E/UKe 813]; W. v. W. 2004 S.C. 63 IH (1 Div) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 805]; White v. Northumberland [2006] NZFLR 1105, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 902].

Australia

H.Z. v. State Central Authority [2006] Fam CA 466, INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 876

8 year old expressed objections which went beyond the mere expression of a preference or of ordinary wishes, however, in the light of her age and degree of maturity it would not be appropriate to take account of her views.

Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v. Thorpe (1997) FLC 92-785 INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 212]

Objections of 9 year old upheld

Germany

4 UF 223/98, Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 820]

No fixed age limit.  The 8 year old concerned lacked sufficient maturity.

93 F 178/98 HK, Familengericht Flensburg (Family Court), 18 September 1998, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 325]

Objections of 6 year old gathered, but not upheld. 

Ireland

In the Matter of M. N. (A Child) [2008] IEHC 382, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 992

Detailed assessment of the age at which the views of a child should be heard in the light of Article 11(2) of the Brussels II a Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003).  Order made that the views of a 6 year old be ascertained.

New Zealand

U. v. D. [2002] NZFLR 529, INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 472

Objections of 7 year old considered, but not upheld.

Switzerland

5P.1/2005 /bnm, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 795

No minimum age.  Children aged 9 1/2 and 10 ½ heard, but their objections were not upheld.

5P.3/2007 /bnm, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 894

A child would have the requisite maturity if he was able to understand the nature of the return proceedings. It was not possible to give general guidance as to the minimum age from which a child would be able to deal with such an abstract issue. The Court noted however that research in the field of child psychology suggested a child would only be capable of such reasoning from the age of 11 or 12.  The court of appeal had therefore been entitled not to gather the views of children, then aged 9 and 7.

United Kingdom - England & Wales

Re W (Minors) [2010] EWCA 520 Civ, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 1324

Objections of siblings aged 8 and almost 6 upheld.

The Court accepted that the objections of a child of 6 falling within the exception would have been outside the contemplation of the drafters.  However, Wilson L.J. held that: "...over the last thirty years the need to take decisions about much younger children not necessarily in accordance with their wishes but at any rate in the light of their wishes has taken hold... ."

United Kingdom - Scotland

N.J.C. v. N.P.C. [2008] CSIH 34, 2008 S.C. 571, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 996

Views of 9 ½ year old not gathered; objections of her 15 and 11 year old siblings not upheld.

W. v. W. 2004 S.C. 63 IH (1 Div) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 805]

9 year old not of sufficient maturity to have her views considered - decision of trial judge reversed.

United States

Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001) INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 585]

No minimum age at which objections of a child can be ascertained.  Objections of 8 year old, within the context of an Art. 13(1)b) assessment, upheld.

Escobar v. Flores 183 Cal. App. 4th 737 (2010), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USs 1026]

No minimum age at which objections of a child can be ascertained.  Objections of 8 year old upheld.

Faits

La procédure concernait trois enfants ayant tous la double nationalité américaine et roumaine, nés en mars 1998 et en octobre 2000 (jumeaux). Les parents, qui s'étaient mariés et vivaient aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, avaient eux aussi la double nationalité roumaine et américaine.

Le 1er mai 2007, la Cour supérieure du comté de Forsyth aux États-Unis d'Amérique délivra une injonction interdisant aux parents de déplacer leurs enfants ou de déménager hors de son ressort sans son autorisation expresse.

Le 14 août 2008, le père signa un formulaire notarié autorisant la mère à emmener les enfants pour de courtes vacances en Roumanie. Cependant, la mère ne remit pas les enfants et le 14 octobre 2008, elle demanda le divorce et la garde des enfants au Tribunal de district de Braşov en Roumanie.

Le 19 décembre 2008, le père demanda le divorce et la garde à la Cour supérieure du comté de Forsyth. Cette demande fut finalement rejetée (y compris un appel), notamment pour défaut de compétence.

Le 11 décembre 2008, l'Autorité centrale américaine présenta une demande de retour au Ministère de la Justice roumain.

Le 12 décembre 2008, le Ministère de la Justice roumain contacta la mère et lui demanda d'exprimer sa position sur un éventuel règlement amiable de l'affaire et un retour volontaire des enfants.

Le 4 février 2009, le Ministère de la Justice roumain, agissant en qualité d'Autorité centrale, engagea une procédure pour le compte du père, qui était représenté par un avocat de son choix, devant le Tribunal de comté de Bucarest.

Le 16 avril 2009, le Tribunal de comté de Bucarest rejeta la demande du père sur la base de témoignages et de documents, d'un rapport d'enquête sociale produit par l'autorité des tutelles de Braşov et des témoignages des enfants. Le non-retour fut jugé illicite et bien qu'il ait rejeté un argument fondé sur l'article 13(1)(b) de la Convention de La Haye de 1980 sur l'enlèvement d'enfants, le Tribunal refusa d'ordonner le retour compte tenu des objections des enfants.

Le 24 juin 2009, la Cour d'appel de Bucarest accueillit le recours du père portant sur des questions de droit, cassa le jugement du 16 avril 2009 et ordonna un nouveau procès.

Le 24 novembre 2009, statuant dans le cadre d'une deuxième procédure, le Tribunal de comté de Bucarest rejeta la demande du père, une nouvelle fois en raison de l'opposition des enfants au retour.

Le 25 mars 2010, la Cour d'appel de Bucarest rejeta le recours du père portant sur des points de droit.

Le 20 septembre 2010, le père soumit une requête (No 54443/10) contre la Roumanie à la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (CourEDH) dans laquelle il alléguait que le déroulement, l'issue et les conséquences  de facto de la procédure en vertu de l'article 3 de la Convention de La Haye de 1980 sur l'enlèvement d'enfants avaient violé ses droits garantis, entre autres, par l'article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (CEDH). Il alléguait en outre que la durée de la procédure de divorce et de garde que la mère avait engagée contre lui avait violé ses droits garantis par l'article 6 de la CEDH.

Dispositif

Dans un arrêt à la majorité (par cinq voix contre deux), la CourEDH jugea qu'il y avait eu violation de l'article 8 de la CEDH et, à l'unanimité, qu'il y avait eu violation de l'article 6 de la CEDH.

Motifs

Opposition de l'enfant au retour - art. 13(2)

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Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH)

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Questions procédurales


La Cour ordonna à la Roumanie de verser au père 9 750 euros pour dommage moral et 8 000 euros pour frais et dépens.

Auteur du résumé : Peter McEleavy

Commentaire INCADAT

Jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme (CourEDH)

Sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales

Résumé INCADAT en cours de préparation.

Âge et maturité requis

L’article 13(2) ne prévoit pas d’âge minimum à partir duquel il convient de s’enquérir des objections de l’enfant, il applique plutôt une formule qui indique que l’enfant doit avoir « atteint un âge et une maturité où il se révèle approprié de tenir compte de cette opinion ». Néanmoins, en formulant cette exception, les rédacteurs de la Convention avaient principalement en tête les adolescents qui ne souhaitent pas retourner dans leur État d’origine.

Indubitablement influencées par les pratiques internes en droit de la famille, différentes tendances se sont développées dans les États contractants quant à la manière d’appliquer cette exception. En outre, au fil de l’application de la Convention dans les États, ces tendances ont connu des évolutions, en particulier au fur et à mesure que les enfants ont été reconnus en qualité d’acteurs juridiques à part entière de leurs propres droits. En effet, au sein de l’Union européenne (UE), à tout le moins eu égard aux enlèvements cantonnés au territoire de l’UE, l’on doit veiller à ce que l’enfant ait la possibilité d’être entendu, à moins que cela n’apparaisse inapproprié eu égard à son âge ou son degré de maturité : Règlement Bruxelles II bis, art. 11(2).

La question de l’âge et de la maturité est étroitement liée au seuil appliqué dans le cadre de cette exception, autrement dit au critère utilisé pour déterminer les circonstances dans lesquelles il peut sembler approprié de prendre en compte les objections de l’enfant, voir par exemple Re T. (Enlèvement : Objection de l’enfant au retour) [2000] 2 FLR 192 [INCADAT cite HC/E/UKe 270] ; Zaffino v. Zaffino [2006] 1 FLR 410 [INCADAT cite HC/E/UKe 813]; W. v. W. 2004 S.C. 63 IH (1 Div) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 805]; White v. Northumberland [2006] NZFLR 1105, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 902].

Australie

H.Z. v. State Central Authority [2006] Fam CA 466, INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 876

Un enfant de huit ans a présenté des objections qui allaient au-delà d’une simple expression de sa préférence ou de souhaits ordinaires. Néanmoins, compte tenu de son âge et de son degré de maturité, il ne serait pas approprié de prendre son point de vue en considération.

Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v. Thorpe (1997) FLC 92-785 INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 212]

Reconnaissance du bien-fondé des objections d’un enfant de neuf ans.

Allemagne

4 UF 223/98, Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 820]

Aucun âge limite fixé. Il a été jugé que l’enfant de huit ans manquait de maturité.

93 F 178/98 HK, Familengericht Flensburg (Family Court), 18 septembre 1998, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 325]

Recueil des objections d’un enfant de six ans, mais elles n’ont pas été retenues.

Irlande

In the Matter of M. N. (A Child) [2008] IEHC 382, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 992

Examen détaillé de l’âge à partir duquel il convient d’entendre l’enfant conformément à l’article 11(2) du Règlement Bruxelles II bis (Règlement du Conseil (CE) No 2201/2003 du 27 novembre 2003). Ordre de prendre en considération le point de vue d’un enfant de six ans.

Nouvelle-Zélande

U. v. D. [2002] NZFLR 529, INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 472

Recueil des objections d’un enfant de sept ans, mais elles n’ont pas été retenues.

Suisse

5P.1/2005 /bnm, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 795

Pas d’âge minimum. Audition d’enfants âgés de neuf ans et demi et dix ans et demi, mais leurs objections n’ont pas été retenues.

5P.3/2007 /bnm, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 894

L’on considèrera qu’un enfant dispose de la maturité suffisante s’il est en mesure de comprendre la nature de la procédure de retour. Il n’a pas été possible de donner des directives générales quant à l’âge minimum à partir duquel un enfant serait capable de comprendre une question si abstraite. Le tribunal a toutefois constaté que les recherches dans le domaine de la psychologie enfantine avaient tendance à indiquer qu’un enfant ne serait capable d’avoir un tel raisonnement qu’à partir de 11 ou 12 ans. La Cour d’appel était donc en droit de ne pas recueillir les avis d’enfants âgés de neuf et sept ans.

Royaume-Uni - Angleterre & Pays de Galle

Re W (Minors) [2010] EWCA 520 Civ, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 1324

Prise en compte des objections de deux enfants de huit et presque six ans.

Le tribunal a admis que les objections d’un enfant de six ans tombant sous le coup de l’exception ne correspondaient pas à ce que les rédacteurs avaient envisagé. Cependant, Wilson L.J. a conclu « [… qu’]au cours des 30 dernières années, la nécessité de prendre des décisions à l’égard d’enfants de plus en plus jeunes qui ne correspondent pas nécessairement à leurs souhaits, mais dans tous les cas, à la lumière de ces souhaits, s’était imposée » [traduction du Bureau Permanent].

Royaume-Uni - Écosse

N.J.C. v. N.P.C. [2008] CSIH 34, 2008 S.C. 571, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 996

Pas d’audition d’un enfant de neuf ans et demi ; pas de prise en compte des objections de ses frères et sœurs de 11 et 15 ans.

W. v. W. 2004 S.C. 63 IH (1 Div) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 805]

Il a été jugé qu’une enfant de neuf ans n’était pas suffisamment mature pour que l’on prenne en compte son avis – décision du juge de première instance annulée.

États-Unis d’Amérique

Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001) INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 585]

Pas d’âge minimum à partir duquel il convient de prendre en considération les objections d’un enfant. Prise en compte des objections d’un enfant de huit ans, dans le contexte de l’examen de l’exception de l’article 13(1)(b).

Escobar v. Flores 183 Cal. App. 4th 737 (2010), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USs 1026]

Pas d’âge minimum à partir duquel il convient de prendre en considération les objections d’un enfant. Prise en compte des objections d’un enfant de huit ans.

Hechos

El asunto trataba sobre tres niños, todos ellos poseedores de doble ciudadanía, estadounidense y rumana, nacidos en marzo de 1998 y octubre de 2000 (mellizos). Sus padres, quienes contrajeron matrimonio en los Estados Unidos y vivían allí, también tenían esta doble ciudadanía.

El 1 de marzo de 2007 el Tribunal Superior del Condado de Forsyth de los Estados Unidos libró una orden judicial por la que se prohibía a los padres trasladar a los niños o vivir fuera de la jurisdicción de dicho tribunal sin su autorización expresa.

El 14 de agosto de 2008 el padre firmó un documento notarial por el que autorizaba a la madre a llevar a los niños de vacaciones a Rumanía. Sin embargo, la madre no regresó con los niños y el 14 de octubre de 2008 formuló demanda de divorcio y custodia de los hijos ante el Tribunal del Distrito de Braşov en Rumanía.

En fecha 19 de diciembre de 2008 el padre presentó demanda por divorcio y custodia de los hijos ante el Tribunal Superior del Condado de Forsyth, la cual fue desestimada (así como también el recurso de apelación) por incompetencia del tribunal, entre otras razones.

El 11 de diciembre de 2008 la Autoridad Central de los Estados Unidos transmitió una demanda de restitución al Ministerio de Justicia de Rumanía.

El 12 de diciembre de 2008 el Ministerio de Justicia de Rumanía contactó a la madre para que expresara su opinión sobre la posibilidad de un acuerdo amistoso y la restitución voluntaria de los hijos.

El 4 de febrero de 2009 el Ministerio de Justicia de Rumanía, en tanto que Autoridad Central, inició un procedimiento ante el Tribunal del Condado de Bucarest en nombre del padre, representado por un abogado a su elección.

El 16 de abril de 2009 el Tribunal del Condado de Bucarest desestimó la acción del padre fundándose en las pruebas testimoniales y documentales, un informe de investigación social preparado por la autoridad tutelar de Braşov, y los testimonios de los menores. Se constató que la retención había sido ilícita, y aunque se desestimó un argumento en virtud del artículo 13(1) b) del Convenio de La Haya sobre sustracción de menores, el tribunal se negó a ordenar la restitución en base a la oposición de los menores.

El 24 de junio de 2009 el Tribunal de Apelaciones de Bucarest concedió el recurso de apelación presentado por el padre para plantear cuestiones de derecho, revocó la sentencia de fecha 16 de abril de 2009, y ordenó que la causa volviera a primera instancia.

El 24 de noviembre de 2009, luego de un segundo procedimiento, el Tribunal del Condado de Bucarest desestimó la acción del padre, una vez más fundándose en la oposición de los hijos.

El 25 de marzo de 2010 el Tribunal de Apelaciones de Bucarest desestimó el recurso de apelación presentado por el padre por cuestiones de derecho.

En fecha 20 de septiembre de 2010 el padre presentó demanda contra Rumanía (N° 54443/10) ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH). En su exposición puntualizó que el desarrollo del procedimiento en virtud del artículo 3 del Convenio de La Haya sobre sustracción de menores, así como su resultado y sus consecuencias de hecho, habían vulnerado sus derechos garantizados por el artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH). Además, afirmó que la duración del procedimiento de divorcio y custodia de los hijos, iniciado por la madre en su contra, había violado sus derechos garantizados en el artículo 6 del CEDH.

Fallo

Por una mayoría de cinco votos a favor y dos en contra, el TEDH declaró la existencia de una vulneración del artículo 8 del CEDH y, de forma unánime, una vulneración del artículo 6 del mismo instrumento.

Fundamentos

Objeciones del niño a la restitución - art. 13(2)

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Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)


Artículo 8 del CEDH:
El padre sostuvo que los tribunales rumanos:

• habían malinterpretado las disposiciones del Convenio de La Haya de 1980 sobre sustracción de menores y solo se habían basado en la opinión de los niños para denegar su restitución a los Estados Unidos;
• no habían expresado razones suficientes que justificaran el haber ignorado las órdenes judiciales emitidas por los tribunales estadounidenses, así como los documentos transmitidos por las autoridades de ese país;
• no habían actuado con celeridad, lo cual lo había privado de ejercer sus derechos parentales, ya que los niños habían quedado al cuidado de la madre;
• y que al prorrogar ilícitamente la competencia sobre la cuestión de hecho de la custodia de los hijos, los tribunales rumanos lo habían discriminado y colocado en una situación de clara desventaja frente a su esposa.

(Véase también más arriba "Artículo 13(2)" con respecto a la relación entre esta disposición y el artículo 8 del CEDH).

El Tribunal declaró que el rechazo de la demanda de restitución del padre constituía una injerencia en su derecho al respeto a la vida familiar. No obstante, como la injerencia estaba prevista por la ley, había que determinar si "en una sociedad democrática [era] necesaria" en el sentido del artículo 8(2) del CEDH. Con respecto a lograr un equilibrio entre los distintos derechos en juego, había que determinar si las autoridades rumanas habían actuado con rapidez y si habían dado la debida consideración al interés superior de los niños dentro del margen de apreciación que el Estado tiene para esas cuestiones.

El Tribunal señaló que, dado que el Preámbulo del Convenio de La Haya de 1980 sobre sustracción de menores dispone la restitución del niño "al Estado de su residencia habitual", se debe generar la convicción de los tribunales de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Europa de que ese país cuenta con salvaguardias adecuadas y, en caso de que se conociere una situación de riesgo, de que dispone de medidas de protección concretas.

Además señaló, respecto de la reunificación de los hijos con sus padres, que también se debía evaluar el plazo y la implementación de la medida. Estos casos deben ser tramitados con urgencia ya que el transcurso del tiempo puede tener consecuencias irreversibles en la relación de los niños con el padre ausente.

El Tribunal indicó que habían transcurrido trece meses entre la fecha en que el padre había formulado demanda de restitución y la fecha en que se había dictado sentencia definitiva. Consideró que las autoridades nacionales no habían actuado con celeridad, lo cual constituye un incumplimiento manifiesto de la ley aplicable.

El Juez López Guerra, a quien se unió el Juez Motoc, expresó su disidencia respecto de la opinión de la Sala sobre la configuración de una violación al artículo 8. Véase más arriba "Oposición a la restitución del niño - artículo 13(2)".

Artículo 6 del CEDH:
El Tribunal observó que el procedimiento de divorcio y custodia de los hijos iniciado por la madre en Rumanía se había extendido desde el 14 de octubre de 2008 hasta el 12 de marzo de 2014, es decir que había demorado cinco años y cinco meses en recorrer tres instancias. De forma unánime, el Tribunal consideró que había habido repetidos retrasos procesales a lo largo de todo el procedimiento. Declaró que la extensión total del procedimiento no había respetado el requisito del "plazo razonable". En consecuencia, se estaba frente a una vulneración del artículo 6 § 1 del CEDH.

Cuestiones procesales


Se concedió al padre la suma de 9 750 euros en concepto de daño moral y 8 000 euros por gastos y costas.

Autor del resumen: Peter McEleavy

Comentario INCADAT

Fallos del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH)

Protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales

Resumen INCADAT en curso de preparación.

Edad y grado de madurez requeridos

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