CASE

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Case Name

VK and AK v CC [2013] NIFam 6

INCADAT reference

HC/E/UKn 1250

Court

Country

UNITED KINGDOM - NORTHERN IRELAND

Name

High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland - Family Division

Level

First Instance

Judge(s)
Maguire J.

States involved

Requesting State

LITHUANIA

Requested State

UNITED KINGDOM - NORTHERN IRELAND

Decision

Date

10 June 2013

Status

Subject to appeal

Grounds

Rights of Custody - Art. 3

Order

Application dismissed

HC article(s) Considered

3

HC article(s) Relied Upon

3

Other provisions
Article 2 of the Brussels IIa Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003)
Authorities | Cases referred to
Hunter v Murrow (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2005] 2 FLR 1119; Re D [2007] 1 AC 619; Re B (A Minor) (Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249; C v C (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [1989] 1 FLR 403; Re O (Child Abduction: Custody Rights) [1997] 2 FLR 702; Re G (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2002] 2 FLR 703; Re F (Abduction: Unmarried Father: Sole Carer) [2003] 1 FLR 839; Re J (A Minor) (Abduction) [1990] 2 AC 562; Re C (Child Abduction) (Unmarried Father: Rights of Custody) [2003] 1 FLR 252; McB v E [2011] Fam 364.

INCADAT comment

Article 12 Return Mechanism

Rights of Custody
Inchoate Rights of Custody

SUMMARY

Summary available in EN | ES

Facts

The proceedings concerned a child born in Lithuania in March 2005 to a Lithuanian mother. The child's father played no part in his life. Shortly after the birth, the mother left the child in the care of the maternal grandparents.

Sometime thereafter, at least by May 2006, the mother relocated to Northern Ireland. There was then some phone contact between mother and grandparents and a couple of visits. The Court also found that the mother sent back money to the grandparents from time to time.

In July 2010, the mother had a child in Northern Ireland with her new partner. In February 2012, the mother and her partner travelled to Lithuania with the intention of taking the first child back to Northern Ireland. The mother submitted to the Court that she considered taking legal steps to achieve this objective, but finally decided to take matters into her own hands.

The Court found that on 12 March, the mother and her partner pulled the child from the grandmother, put him in a van and transported him via Slovakia, Germany, France and England to Northern Ireland. The maternal grandparents petitioned for the child's return to Lithuania.

Ruling

Application dismissed; the removal of the child was not wrongful as it was not in breach of any legally recognised right of custody.

Grounds

Rights of Custody - Art. 3


The Court found that at all material times, from shortly after the birth to the date of abduction in 2012, the grandparents were, at the very least, the de facto carers of the child. The position was formalised on 10 January 2007 when the grandmother was given "temporary care (custody)" of the child by the administration director of Klaipeda City Municipality. On 28 February 2012, the temporary care order was discontinued.

The Court noted that the grandmother had been granted an authorisation by the mother on 13 April 2005 to visit all medical institutions and hospitals with the child. And, on 20 April 2006, the mother had signed a power of attorney giving the grandmother authority to receive the passport of the child and to deal with legal and governmental institutions in respect of the child on her behalf. The power of attorney was stated to be valid until 20 April 2016.

The Court considered first what rights the grandparents had under Lithuanian law. It found, on the balance of probabilities, that at the date of the abduction they enjoyed only "moral" or de facto rights to care for the child. They did not have "rights of custody" as a matter of Lithuanian law.

The Court then considered the line of English authority relating to "inchoate rights of custody". In Re B (A Minor) (Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 4] Waite L.J. held:

"If, before the child's abduction, the aggrieved parent was exercising functions in the requesting State of a parental or custodial nature without the benefit of any court order or official custodial status, it must in every case be a question for the courts of the requested State to determine whether any of those functions fall to be regarded as "rights of custody" within the terms of the Convention."

The Court accepted that the grandparents had been the child's exclusive carers over a lengthy period, and, if the line of authority on inchoate rights of custody was followed, they ought to be viewed as having rights of custody for Convention purposes.

The Court found however that the line of authority should not be followed. First, the Court questioned whether it was appropriate to consider the grandparents' situation in the context of inchoate rights of custody, given that it may have been that the grandmother had rights of custody by virtue of the 2007 decision of the administration director of Klaipeda City Municipality but that those rights had been discontinued shortly before the child's removal.

The Court also questioned whether the inchoate rights of custody line of cases could be viewed as being in breach of the authority of the House of Lords as expressed in its decision in Re J (A Minor) (Abduction) [1990] 2 AC 562 [INCADAT Reference HC/E/UKe 2]. The Court noted that the more recent decision of the House of Lords in Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 1 AC 619 [INCADAT Reference HC/E/UKe 880] made no reference to the inchoate right of custody line of authorities in circumstances where the issue of how rights of custody for the purpose of the Convention were to be identified, was directly under discussion.

Finally, the Court referred to Case C-400/10 PPU J. McB. v. L.E. [2011] Fam 364 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/ 1104] in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that for the purposes of the Brussels IIa Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003), the wrongfulness of a child's removal was entirely dependent on the existence of rights of custody, conferred by the relevant national law.

In deciding how to treat the grandparents' application, the Court concluded that it was better to follow the line of authority beginning with Re J and ending with the CJEU's view in McB v E. The Court stated that it was unattracted by the proposition that it should read the international provisions in the present case as including "inchoate rights of custody".

It held that at the relevant time, the removal of the child was not in breach of any legally recognised right of the grandparents in Lithuania law, and it followed that there had not been a wrongful removal of the child for the purpose of the Hague Convention when read with the provisions of the Brussels IIa Regulation.

Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy

INCADAT comment

See also the decision of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal VK, AK v CC [2014] NICA 15 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKn 1257] and decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom In the Matter of K (A child) (Northern Ireland) [2014] UKSC 29 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKn 1259].

Inchoate Rights of Custody

The reliance on 'inchoate custody rights', to afford a Convention remedy to applicants who have actively cared for removed or retained children, but who do not possess legal custody rights, was first identified in the English decision:

Re B. (A Minor) (Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 4],

and has subsequently been followed in that jurisdiction in:

Re O. (Child Abduction: Custody Rights) [1997] 2 FLR 702, [1997] Fam Law 781 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 5];

Re G. (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2002] 2 FLR 703 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 505].

The concept has been the subject of judicial consideration in:

Re W. (Minors) (Abduction: Father's Rights) [1999] Fam 1 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/Uke 503];

Re B. (A Minor) (Abduction: Father's Rights) [1999] Fam 1 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 504];

Re G. (Child Abduction) (Unmarried Father: Rights of Custody) [2002] EWHC 2219 (Fam); [2002] ALL ER (D) 79 (Nov), [2003] 1 FLR 252 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 506].

In one English first instance decision: Re J. (Abduction: Declaration of Wrongful Removal) [1999] 2 FLR 653 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 265], it was questioned whether the concept was in accordance with the decision of the House of Lords in Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 2] where it was held that de facto custody was not sufficient to amount to rights of custody for the purposes of the Convention.

The concept of 'inchoate custody rights', has attracted support and opposition in other Contracting States.

The concept has attracted support in a New Zealand first instance case: Anderson v. Paterson [2002] NZFLR 641 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 471].

However, the concept was specifically rejected by the majority of the Irish Supreme Court in the decision of: H.I. v. M.G. [1999] 2 ILRM 1; [2000] 1 IR 110 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 284].

Keane J. stated that it would go too far to accept that there was 'an undefined hinterland of inchoate rights of custody not attributed in any sense by the law of the requesting state to the party asserting them or to the court itself, but regard by the court of the requested state as being capable of protection under the terms of the Convention.'

The Court of Justice of the European Union has subsequently upheld the position adopted by the Irish Courts:

Case C-400/10 PPU J. McB. v. L.E., [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ 1104].

In its ruling the European Court noted that the attribution of rights of custody, which were not accorded to an unmarried father under national law, would be incompatible with the requirements of legal certainty and with the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, notably those of the mother. 

This formulation leaves open the status of ‘incohate rights’ in a EU Member State where the concept had become part of national law.  The United Kingdom (England & Wales) would fall into this category, but it must be recalled that pursuant to the terms of Protocol (No. 30) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom (OJ C 115/313, 9 May 2008), the CJEU could not in any event make a finding of inconsistency with regard to UK law vis-a-vis Charter rights. 

For academic criticism of the concept of inchoate rights see: Beaumont P.R. and McEleavy P.E. 'The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction' Oxford, OUP, 1999, at p. 60.

Hechos

El caso versa sobre un niño nacido en Lituania en marzo de 2005 de madre lituana. El padre del niño no estuvo presente en su vida. Poco después del nacimiento, la madre dejó al niño al cuidado de los abuelos maternos. 

Un tiempo después, al menos para mayo de 2006, la madre se instaló en Irlanda del Norte. Hubo entonces cierto contacto telefónico entre la madre y los abuelos y algunas visitas. El tribunal de primera instancia también constató que, ocasionalmente, la madre enviaba dinero a los abuelos.

En julio de 2010, la madre tuvo un hijo en Irlanda del Norte con su nueva pareja. En febrero de 2012, la madre y su pareja viajaron a Lituania con la intención de llevar a su primer hijo a Irlanda del Norte. La madre declaró ante el tribunal de primera instancia que consideró tomar medidas legales para lograr este objetivo, pero que finalmente decidió resolverlo ella misma.


El tribunal constató que el 12 de marzo, la madre y su pareja le sacaron el niño de la abuela, lo subieron a una camioneta y lo transportaron a través de Eslovaquia, Alemania, Francia e Inglaterra hasta Irlanda del Norte. Los abuelos maternos solicitaron la restitución del niño a Lituania.

Fallo

Solicitud desestimada; el traslado del niño no fue ilícito ya que no se infringió ningún derecho de custodia reconocido legalmente.

Fundamentos

Derechos de custodia - art. 3

El Tribunal observó que, en todo momento, desde poco después del nacimiento hasta la fecha del traslado en 2012, los abuelos fueron, como mínimo, los cuidadores de facto del niño. La posición se formalizó el 10 de enero de 2007, cuando el director de la Administración de la Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Klaipėda concedió a la abuela el "cuidado temporal (custodia)" del niño. El 28 de febrero de 2012, se suspendió la orden de cuidado temporal.

El Tribunal señaló que la madre había concedido a la abuela una autorización el 13 de abril de 2005 para concurrir a cualquier institución médica u hospital con el niño. Además, el 20 de abril de 2006, la madre había firmado un poder notarial de representación que autorizaba a la abuela a recibir el pasaporte del niño y a tratar en su nombre asuntos relacionados con el niño en instituciones legales y gubernamentales. Dicho poder era válido hasta el 20 de abril de 2016.

El Tribunal analizó en primer lugar qué derechos tenían los abuelos en virtud de la legislación lituana. Determinó, en base al balance de las probabilidades, que a la fecha de la sustracción solo gozaban de derechos "morales" o de facto para cuidar del niño. No tenían "derechos de custodia" en virtud de la legislación lituana.

Luego, el Tribunal analizó la jurisprudencia inglesa relativa a los "derechos de custodia imperfectos". En Re B (A Minor) (Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249 [Referencia de INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 4], el juez Waite sostuvo lo siguiente:

"Si, antes de la sustracción del niño, el progenitor perjudicado ejercía funciones en el Estado requirente de naturaleza parental o de custodia sin el beneficio de ninguna orden judicial o estatuto oficial de custodia, debe ser en todo caso una cuestión reservada a los tribunales del Estado requerido determinar si alguna de esas funciones debe considerarse como ‘derecho de custodia’ en los términos del Convenio".

El Tribunal aceptó que los abuelos habían sido los únicos cuidadores del niño durante un periodo prolongado y, si se seguía la línea de autoridad sobre los derechos de custodia imperfectos, debía considerarse que tenían derechos de custodia a efectos del Convenio.

Sin embargo, el Tribunal consideró que no debía seguirse la línea de autoridad. En primer lugar, cuestionó si era apropiado considerar la situación de los abuelos en el contexto de los derechos de custodia imperfectos, dado que podía ser que la abuela tuviera derechos de custodia en virtud de la decisión de 2007 del director de la Administración de la Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Klaipėda, pero que esos derechos hubieran cesado poco antes del traslado del niño.

El Tribunal también cuestionó si la línea de casos de derechos de custodia imperfectos podía considerarse contraria a la autoridad de la Cámara de los Lores expresada en su decisión en Re J (A Minor) (Abduction) [1990] 2 AC 562 [Referencia de INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 2]. El Tribunal observó que la decisión más reciente de la Cámara de los Lores en Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 1 AC 619 [Referencia de INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 880] no hacía referencia a la línea de autoridades sobre derechos de custodia imperfectos en circunstancias en las que se debatía directamente la cuestión de cómo debían identificarse los derechos de custodia a efectos del Convenio.

Por último, el Tribunal se refirió al caso C-400/10 PPU J. McB. c. L.E. [2011] Fam 364 [Referencia de INCADAT: HC/E/ 1104], en el que el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (TJUE) sostuvo que, a efectos del Reglamento Bruselas II bis (Reglamento (CE) N.º 2201/2003 del Consejo, de 27 de noviembre de 2003), la ilicitud del traslado de un niño dependía enteramente de la existencia de derechos de custodia, conferidos por la ley nacional pertinente.

Al decidir cómo tratar la solicitud de los abuelos, el Tribunal concluyó que era mejor seguir la línea de autoridad que comenzaba con Re J y terminaba con la opinión del TJUE en J. McB. c. L. E. El Tribunal declaró que no le atraía la propuesta de que debía interpretar las disposiciones internacionales en el presente caso como si incluyeran "derechos de custodia imperfectos".

Sostuvo que, en el momento pertinente, el traslado del niño no violaba ningún derecho legalmente reconocido de los abuelos en la legislación lituana, y de ello se deducía que no había habido un traslado ilícito del niño a los efectos del Convenio de La Haya cuando se leía con las disposiciones del Reglamento Bruselas II bis.

Autor: Peter McEleavy

Comentario INCADAT

Véase asimismo la decisión del Tribunal de Apelación de Irlanda del Norte en VK, AK v CC [2014] NICA 15 [Referencia de INCADAT: HC/E/UKn 1257] y la decisión del Tribunal Supremo del Reino Unido en In the Matter of K (A child) (Northern Ireland) [2014] UKSC 29 [Referencia de INCADAT: HC/E/UKn 1259].

Derechos de custodia imperfectos

La invocación de "derechos de custodia imperfectos" para que pueda activarse el mecanismo convencional para solicitantes que han cuidado activamente de menores trasladados o retenidos pero que carecen de derechos de custodia, fue identificada por primera vez en la decisión inglesa:

Re B. (A Minor) (Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 4],

y seguida posteriormente en dicha jurisdicción en:

Re O. (Child Abduction: Custody Rights) [1997] 2 FLR 702, [1997] Fam Law 781 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 5];

Re G. (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2002] 2 FLR 703 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 505].

El concepto ha sido objeto de consideración judicial en:

Re W. (Minors) (Abduction: Father's Rights) [1999] Fam 1 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/Uke 503];

Re B. (A Minor) (Abduction: Father's Rights) [1999] Fam 1 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 504];

Re G. (Child Abduction) (Unmarried Father: Rights of Custody) [2002] EWHC 2219 (Fam); [2002] ALL ER (D) 79 (Nov), [2003] 1 FLR 252 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 506].

En una decisión inglesa de primera instancia, Re J. (Abduction: Declaration of Wrongful Removal) [1999] 2 FLR 653 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 265], se puso en duda si el concepto era congruente con la decisión de la Cámara de los Lores en Re J. (A Minor)(Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 2], donde se sostuvo que la custodia de facto no era suficiente para constituir derechos de custodia en el sentido del Convenio.

El concepto de "derechos de custodia imperfectos" ha suscitado tanto apoyo como oposición en otros Estados contratantes.

El concepto obtuvo apoyo en la decisión de primera instancia de Nueva Zelanda:
Anderson v. Paterson [2002] NZFLR 641 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/NZ 471].

Sin embargo, el concepto fue expresamente rechazado por la mayoría del Tribunal Supremo de Irlanda en la decisión de: H.I. v. M.G. [1999] 2 ILRM 1; [2000] 1 IR 110 [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/IE 284].

Keane J. afirmó que sería ir demasiado lejos aceptar que había "un área remota indefinida de derechos de custodia imperfectos no atribuidos en ningún sentido por el Derecho del Estado requirente a la parte que los invoca o al propio tribunal, sino un reconocimiento por parte del Estado requerido de su capacidad de protección según los términos del Convenio."

Para una crítica académica del concepto, véase:

Beaumont P.R. and McEleavy P.E., The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, Oxford, OUP, 1999, en p. 60. Actualizado el 31 de marzo de 2005 y el 17 de febrero de 2009.