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Case Name
Bayer v. Bayer [2012] NZFLR 567
INCADAT reference
HC/E/NZ 1230
Court
NEW ZEALAND
Family Court, Welligton
First Instance
Judge PF Boshier
States involved
GERMANY
NEW ZEALAND
Decision
7 May 2012
Final
Habitual Residence - Art. 3 | Consent - Art. 13(1)(a) | Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a) | Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)
Application dismissed
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Basingstoke v. Groot [2007] NZFLR 363, (2006) 26 FRNZ 707 (CA); H (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence), In re [1998] AC 72, [1997] 2 All ER 225 (UKHL); J (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights), In re [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 3 WLR 492 (UKHL); JHL v. Secretary for Justice [2008] NZFLR 54 , (2007) 27 FRNZ 645 (HC); K (Abduction: Consent), Re [1997] 2 FLR 212 (EWHC); P v. Secretary for Justice [2007] 1 NZLR 40, (2006) 25 FRNZ 327 (CA); Punter v. Secretary for Justice [2004] 2 NZLR 28 (CA); SK v. KP [2005] 3 NZLR 590, [2005] NZFLR 1064 (CA); W v. N [Child Abduction] [2006] NZFLR 793 , (2006) 25 FRNZ 963 (HC); White v. Northumberland [2006] NZFLR 1105 , (2006) 26 FRNZ 189 (CA).
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INCADAT comment
Aims & Scope of the Convention
Habitual Residence
Exceptions to Return
Impact of Convention Proceedings on Siblings and Step-Siblings
Establishing Consent
Acquiescence
SUMMARY
Summary available in
EN
Facts
Permanent residency visas were issued for all family members on 12 October 2007 and indefinite returning resident visas were issued on 30 November 2009. The parents both had jobs in New Zealand, they purchased a home there, and the children attended school. Ties with Germany had not though been completely severed; an apartment was retained in Munich and the extended family lived in Germany.
In October 2009, the parents separated, but they and the children remained living in Wellington. In June 2010, the family went back to Germany. The intentions of the parents with regard to this and subsequent movements between Germany and New Zealand were the subject of dispute.
In Germany, the mother undertook research for a New Zealand certificate she was seeking to obtain. She did not obtain employment in Germany. The father however took up a permanent position in Germany. The children continued to live primarily with the mother and they were re-enrolled in schools in Munich.
Parents and children were re-registered as living in Munich, as they were intending to stay for more than a three-month period. The family's New Zealand property was rented out and the contents placed in storage.
In January 2011, the mother indicated that she wished to return to New Zealand with the children. On 2 February, she did go back, but only with the younger child. The child was re-enrolled in school and the mother continued with her employment. Nevertheless, she also applied for two positions in Germany.
The older child travelled to New Zealand on 4 occasions, in March with his grandmother, and with the father in April, June and August. Prior to his scheduled return in September 2011, the mother asked the older child whether he wished to go back to Germany. The mother then advised the father that the child should stay living in New Zealand.
The father then returned to Germany alone, with both children staying with the mother in New Zealand. The mother then de-registered the older child from the Munich population register. However, on 28 October the mother emailed the father requesting him to continue to reserve the older child's place in his Munich school.
On 16 November, the father applied to the German Central Authority to have the children returned. The father travelled to New Zealand on 25 November. The mother applied for a protection order and also for parenting orders under the Care of Children Act 2004. On 5 February 2012, the father returned to Germany.
Ruling
Grounds
Habitual Residence - Art. 3
The Court noted that the inquiry into habitual residence must be broad and not centred on just some events. The completeness of the whole picture had to be considered. It added that the issue of the children's habitual residence was inextricably linked to their parents' intentions.
The Court found that the parties accepted that the children were habitually resident in New Zealand until June 2010. The issue was what happened after that date. For the mother it was argued that the habitual residence in New Zealand was never lost and the parents continued to formulate plans and keep options open. For the Central Authority / father it was submitted that the return to Germany brought with it an instant change of habitual residence, because the family had again relocated.
The trial judge held that he had little doubt the mother's intention was to return to New Zealand after her study, to complete her New Zealand certificate, to resume her employment with Victoria University and to take up from where she had left life after the period of absence. The intention of the father was much less clear and he may have felt that New Zealand no longer had as much to offer.
As regards the mother's return to New Zealand with the younger child in February 2011, the trial judge's assessment was that the father's expectation was that mother and child would come back to Germany, and that while the return period was not fixed, there would be a finite period involved. The trial judge found that by April 2011 the mother was planning to stay in New Zealand for longer.
The trial judge noted that the younger child had lived in New Zealand throughout 2011 with no objection made by the father; the trip to Germany between June and February 2011 was never a clearly intended relocation. He concluded that the younger child never lost his New Zealand habitual residence. The trial judge found that the position surrounding the older child was less clear and less persuasive, but nevertheless held that this child too retained his New Zealand habitual residence.
The trial judge thereby ruled that the Central Authority had failed to demonstrate that at the time of the children's retention - said to be September 2011 - there had been a wrongful retention in that the children's habitual residence was in Germany.
Consent - Art. 13(1)(a)
As regards the older child, the mother submitted that in handing over his passport to her and in agreeing to his ongoing care arrangements in New Zealand, the father had implicitly consented to this child living in New Zealand when he returned to Germany on 11 September.
The trial judge ruled that this fell short of indicating that the father had consented. In this the trial judge referred to the father's subsequent application to the German Central Authority to have the children returned as indicative of his state of mind as at 16 November 2011 when he made that application.
Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a)
The trial judge noted that whilst the father had petitioned for the return of both children, he had not opposed the younger child living in New Zealand. He noted that when the father had sought advice from a Citizens Advice Bureau in Wellington on 21 October 2011, it was only in relation to the older child - he had not sought advice on the younger child's status or situation. The trial judge ruled that the father had acquiesced in the retention of the younger child.
Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)
The trial judge held that both children were at an age where their views were important, but he held that due to the ambivalence in the expression of their wishes, the latter fell short of coming within an objection to return.
Exercise of Discretion
The trial judge held that had the retention of the children been wrongful, then a difficulty would arise as an exception to return would have been made out only in respect of only one of the siblings (acquiescence as regards the younger child). That being so the trial judge suggested that this could have led to the children being split.
Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy
INCADAT comment
Habitual Residence
The interpretation of the central concept of habitual residence (Preamble, Art. 3, Art. 4) has proved increasingly problematic in recent years with divergent interpretations emerging in different jurisdictions. There is a lack of uniformity as to whether in determining habitual residence the emphasis should be exclusively on the child, with regard paid to the intentions of the child's care givers, or primarily on the intentions of the care givers. At least partly as a result, habitual residence may appear a very flexible connecting factor in some Contracting States yet much more rigid and reflective of long term residence in others.
Any assessment of the interpretation of habitual residence is further complicated by the fact that cases focusing on the concept may concern very different factual situations. For example habitual residence may arise for consideration following a permanent relocation, or a more tentative move, albeit one which is open-ended or potentially open-ended, or indeed the move may be for a clearly defined period of time.
General Trends:
United States Federal Appellate case law may be taken as an example of the full range of interpretations which exist with regard to habitual residence.
Child Centred Focus
The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit has advocated strongly for a child centred approach in the determination of habitual residence:
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 125 ALR Fed. 703 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 142]
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/US 935].
See also:
Villalta v. Massie, No. 4:99cv312-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 1999) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 221].
Combined Child's Connection / Parental Intention Focus
The United States Courts of Appeals for the 3rd and 8th Circuits, have espoused a child centred approach but with reference equally paid to the parents' present shared intentions.
The key judgment is that of Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 83].
See also:
Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 530];
Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 879].
In the latter case a distinction was drawn between the situation of very young children, where particular weight was placed on parental intention(see for example: Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 808]) and that of older children where the impact of parental intention was more limited.
Parental Intention Focus
The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 301] has been highly influential in providing that there should ordinarily be a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence before a child can acquire a new one.
This interpretation has been endorsed and built upon in other Federal appellate decisions so that where there was not a shared intention on the part of the parents as to the purpose of the move this led to an existing habitual residence being retained, even though the child had been away from that jurisdiction for an extended period of time. See for example:
Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 777]: United States habitual residence retained after 8 months of an intended 4 year stay in Germany;
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 780]: United States habitual residence retained during 32 month stay in Mexico;
Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp.2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 482]: United States habitual residence retained during 27 month stay in Greece.
The Mozes approach has also been approved of by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd and 7th Circuits:
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 776];
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (2006 7th Cir.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 878].
It should be noted that within the Mozes approach the 9th Circuit did acknowledge that given enough time and positive experience, a child's life could become so firmly embedded in the new country as to make it habitually resident there notwithstanding lingering parental intentions to the contrary.
Other Jurisdictions
There are variations of approach in other jurisdictions:
Austria
The Supreme Court of Austria has ruled that a period of residence of more than six months in a State will ordinarily be characterized as habitual residence, and even if it takes place against the will of the custodian of the child (since it concerns a factual determination of the centre of life).
8Ob121/03g, Oberster Gerichtshof [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/AT 548].
Canada
In the Province of Quebec, a child centred focus is adopted:
In Droit de la famille 3713, No 500-09-010031-003 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 651], the Cour d'appel de Montréal held that the determination of the habitual residence of a child was a purely factual issue to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case with regard to the reality of the child's life, rather than that of his parents. The actual period of residence must have endured for a continuous and not insignificant period of time; the child must have a real and active link to the place, but there is no minimum period of residence which is specified.
Germany
A child centred, factual approach is also evident in German case law:
2 UF 115/02, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 944].
This has led to the Federal Constitutional Court accepting that a habitual residence may be acquired notwithstanding the child having been wrongfully removed to the new State of residence:
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1206/98, 29. Oktober 1998 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 233].
The Constitutional Court upheld the finding of the Higher Regional Court that the children had acquired a habitual residence in France, notwithstanding the nature of their removal there. This was because habitual residence was a factual concept and during their nine months there, the children had become integrated into the local environment.
Israel
Alternative approaches have been adopted when determining the habitual residence of children. On occasion, strong emphasis has been placed on parental intentions. See:
Family Appeal 1026/05 Ploni v. Almonit [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 865];
Family Application 042721/06 G.K. v Y.K. [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 939].
However, reference has been made to a more child centred approach in other cases. See:
decision of the Supreme Court in C.A. 7206/03, Gabai v. Gabai, P.D. 51(2)241;
FamA 130/08 H v H [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 922].
New Zealand
In contrast to the Mozes approach the requirement of a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence was specifically rejected by a majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. See
S.K. v. K.P. [2005] 3 NZLR 590 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NZ 816].
Switzerland
A child centred, factual approach is evident in Swiss case law:
5P.367/2005/ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CH 841].
United Kingdom
The standard approach is to consider the settled intention of the child's carers in conjunction with the factual reality of the child's life.
Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 2]. For academic commentary on the different models of interpretation given to habitual residence. See:
R. Schuz, "Habitual Residence of Children under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: Theory and Practice", Child and Family Law Quarterly Vol 13, No. 1, 2001, p. 1;
R. Schuz, "Policy Considerations in Determining Habitual Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context", Journal of Transnational Law and Policy Vol. 11, 2001, p. 101.
Impact of Convention Proceedings on Siblings and Step-Siblings
Preparation of INCADAT commentary in progress.
Establishing Consent
Different standards have been applied when it comes to establishing the Article 13(1) a) exception based on consent.
United Kingdom - England & Wales
In an early first instance decision it was held that ordinarily the clear and compelling evidence which was necessary would need to be in writing or at least evidenced by documentary material, see:
Re W. (Abduction: Procedure) [1995] 1 FLR 878, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 37].
This strict view has not been repeated in later first instance English cases, see:
Re C. (Abduction: Consent) [1996] 1 FLR 414 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 53];
Re K. (Abduction: Consent) [1997] 2 FLR 212 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 55].
In Re K. it was held that while consent must be real, positive and unequivocal, there could be circumstances in which a court could be satisfied that consent had been given, even though not in writing. Moreover, there could also be cases where consent could be inferred from conduct.
Germany
21 UF 70/01, Oberlandesgericht Köln, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 491].
Convincing evidence is required to establish consent.
Ireland
R. v. R. [2006] IESC 7; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 817].
The Re K. approach was specifically endorsed by the Irish Supreme Court.
The Netherlands
De Directie Preventie, optredend voor haarzelf en namens F. (vader/father) en H. (de moeder/mother) (14 juli 2000, ELRO-nummer: AA6532, Zaaknr.R99/167HR); [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NL 318].
Consent need not be for a permanent stay. The only issue is that there must be consent and that it has been proved convincingly.
South Africa
Central Authority v. H. 2008 (1) SA 49 (SCA) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ZA 900].
Consent could be express or tacit.
Switzerland
5P.367/2005 /ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 841];
5P.380/2006 /blb; Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile),[INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 895];
5P.1999/2006 /blb, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung ) (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 896];
The Swiss Supreme Court has held that with regard to consent and acquiescence, the left behind parent must clearly agree, explicitly or tacitly, to a durable change in the residence of the child. To this end the burden is on the abducting parent to show factual evidence which would lead to such a belief being plausible.
United States of America
Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 808].
There must be a subjective assessment of what the applicant parent was actually contemplating. Consideration must also be given to the nature and scope of the consent.
Acquiescence
There has been general acceptance that where the exception of acquiescence is concerned regard must be paid in the first instance to the subjective intentions of the left behind parent, see:
Australia
Commissioner, Western Australia Police v. Dormann, JP (1997) FLC 92-766 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 213];
Barry Eldon Matthews (Commissioner, Western Australia Police Service) v. Ziba Sabaghian PT 1767 of 2001 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 345];
Austria
5Ob17/08y, Oberster Gerichtshof, (Austrian Supreme Court) 1/4/2008 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AT 981].
Considering the issue for the first time, Austria's supreme court held that acquiescence in a temporary state of affairs would not suffice for the purposes of Article 13(1) a), rather there had to be acquiescence in a durable change in habitual residence.
Belgium
N° de rôle: 02/7742/A, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles 6/3/2003, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/BE 545];
Canada
Ibrahim v. Girgis, 2008 ONCA 23, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 851];
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] AC 72 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 46];
In this case the House of Lords affirmed that acquiescence was not to be found in passing remarks or letters written by a parent who has recently suffered the trauma of the removal of his children.
Ireland
K. v. K., 6 May 1998, transcript, Supreme Court of Ireland [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 285];
Israel
Dagan v. Dagan 53 P.D (3) 254 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IL 807];
New Zealand
P. v. P., 13 March 2002, Family Court at Greymouth (New Zealand), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 533];
United Kingdom - Scotland
M.M. v. A.M.R. or M. 2003 SCLR 71, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 500];
South Africa
Smith v. Smith 2001 (3) SA 845 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ZA 499];
Switzerland
5P.367/2005 /ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 841].
In keeping with this approach there has also been a reluctance to find acquiescence where the applicant parent has sought initially to secure the voluntary return of the child or a reconciliation with the abducting parent, see:
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] AC 72 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 46];
P. v. P. (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] 2 FLR 835, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 179];
Ireland
R.K. v. J.K. (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [2000] 2 IR 416, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 285];
United States of America
Wanninger v. Wanninger, 850 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1994), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 84];
In the Australian case Townsend & Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community (1999) 24 Fam LR 495, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 290] negotiation over the course of 12 months was taken to amount to acquiescence but, notably, in the court's exercise of its discretion it decided to make a return order.