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Case Name
P v P [2013] CSOH 40, 2013 G.W.D. 12-253
INCADAT reference
HC/E/UKs 1255
Court
UNITED KINGDOM - SCOTLAND
Outer House of the Court of Session
First Instance
Lord Jones
States involved
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED KINGDOM - SCOTLAND
Decision
7 March 2013
Final
Habitual Residence - Art. 3 | Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a) | Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)
Return ordered
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A, Petitioner [2011] CSOH 215; Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 A.C. 144; Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 A.C. 619; C v C 2003 S.L.T. 793, 2003 G.W.D. 16-497; Re C (Minors) (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psychological Harm) [1999] 1 F.L.R. 1145; H v H (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] A.C. 72; Soucie v Soucie 1995 S.C. 134 ; Re (A Minor) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 1 F.L.R. 682; Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1992] Fam. 106; Dickson v Dickson 1990 S.C.L.R. 692.
INCADAT comment
Exceptions to Return
Acquiescence
Aims & Scope of the Convention
Habitual Residence
SUMMARY
Summary available in
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Facts
On 10 May 2012, the mother filed a petition seeking the return of the child. On 9 July, the Outer House of the Court of Session ordered that the child be returned within seven days: P v P [2012] CSOH 121, 2012 G.W.D. 25-524. An appeal against that order was allowed by the Inner House of the Court of Session on 5 September 2012 for procedural reasons. A rehearing was convened in December 2012.
Ruling
Grounds
Habitual Residence - Art. 3
The father's case was that the child was habitually resident in Scotland having been brought to the country to settle pursuant to an agreement between the parents which contained no reservation. For the mother, the child remained habitually resident in the United States of America because when the father travelled to Scotland in February 2011 for a two-month stay, there was no agreement the family would actually settle in Scotland.
On the evidence the Court found that the mother did not give her permission for the child to stay in Scotland without her living there with the child. The Court also accepted that the permission the mother gave the father was conditional: only if the parties worked out their differences and decided to live together in Scotland, would they all be in Scotland together.
The Court held that the relevant test for determining habitual residence was that enunciated in the Scottish appellate ruling Dickson v Dickson 1990 S.C.L.R. 692 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKs 73], namely that where parents separated, the child's habitual residence could only be changed by one parent if the other consented.
The Court held that, when the father left the United States of America with the child on 28 February 2011, the mother neither consented to the child's changing his habitual residence nor had she formed the intention that the child would settle in Scotland. Although both parents hoped for a reconciliation, neither knew whether or not that would happen. Relocation as a family was to depend on a full reconciliation, which had not yet happened, and never did. The mother did not consent to the child's settling in Scotland with the father, in the event that she did not join them. Therefore the child continued to be habitually resident in the United States of America and therefore the retention of the child by the father in May 2011, without the mother's consent, was wrongful, within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention.
Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a)
The father submitted that the mother's conduct between May 2011 and making her application to the United States of America Central Authority on 6 February 2012 was inconsistent with seeking the summary return of the child to his place of habitual residence and amounted to acquiescence. In this he noted that there was a complete lack of any reference to the mother seeking or requiring the return of the child in any email, text or Facebook message. The father accepted however that the mother had sought the return of the child in phone calls, but he submitted that these were made in anger and later retracted. The mother's position was that between 24 May and 2 November 2011, she attempted to resolve the parties' relationship difficulties in the hope that the child would be voluntarily returned to her. The Court accepted the mother's case, finding that it was only when it appeared that here would be no reconciliation and the father would not return the child voluntarily, that she raised divorce proceedings in California, seeking custody of the child and subsequently issued return proceedings in Scotland. The Court held that it could not be said that the length of time which elapsed from the retention, in May 2011, until the initiation of proceedings in February 2012, of itself demonstrated acquiescence. It noted that the mother was not passive during that period.
Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)
The Court appointed an independent expert to report on the effect of a return on the child. She concluded that the child could return to the care of his mother in California without there being a grave risk that his return would expose him to physical or psychological harm, or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.
The Court noted that it was an inherent feature of Hague Convention cases that some delay between summary return and the resolution of residence and contact disputes was to be expected. In the present case, the father had not offered to prove that such delay would be extraordinary or, for some other reason relevant to his Article 13(1) b) defence.
The Court noted that the child had not been in California for two years and that he would be in an unfamiliar situation. The Court held, however, that the consequences of going back would be no more than was inherent in the inevitable disruption, uncertainty and anxiety which followed a return to the jurisdiction of the court of habitual residence. There was no grave risk that the child's return would place him in an intolerable situation.
Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy
INCADAT comment
Acquiescence
There has been general acceptance that where the exception of acquiescence is concerned regard must be paid in the first instance to the subjective intentions of the left behind parent, see:
Australia
Commissioner, Western Australia Police v. Dormann, JP (1997) FLC 92-766 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 213];
Barry Eldon Matthews (Commissioner, Western Australia Police Service) v. Ziba Sabaghian PT 1767 of 2001 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 345];
Austria
5Ob17/08y, Oberster Gerichtshof, (Austrian Supreme Court) 1/4/2008 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AT 981].
Considering the issue for the first time, Austria's supreme court held that acquiescence in a temporary state of affairs would not suffice for the purposes of Article 13(1) a), rather there had to be acquiescence in a durable change in habitual residence.
Belgium
N° de rôle: 02/7742/A, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles 6/3/2003, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/BE 545];
Canada
Ibrahim v. Girgis, 2008 ONCA 23, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 851];
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] AC 72 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 46];
In this case the House of Lords affirmed that acquiescence was not to be found in passing remarks or letters written by a parent who has recently suffered the trauma of the removal of his children.
Ireland
K. v. K., 6 May 1998, transcript, Supreme Court of Ireland [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 285];
Israel
Dagan v. Dagan 53 P.D (3) 254 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IL 807];
New Zealand
P. v. P., 13 March 2002, Family Court at Greymouth (New Zealand), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 533];
United Kingdom - Scotland
M.M. v. A.M.R. or M. 2003 SCLR 71, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 500];
South Africa
Smith v. Smith 2001 (3) SA 845 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ZA 499];
Switzerland
5P.367/2005 /ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 841].
In keeping with this approach there has also been a reluctance to find acquiescence where the applicant parent has sought initially to secure the voluntary return of the child or a reconciliation with the abducting parent, see:
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] AC 72 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 46];
P. v. P. (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] 2 FLR 835, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 179];
Ireland
R.K. v. J.K. (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [2000] 2 IR 416, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 285];
United States of America
Wanninger v. Wanninger, 850 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1994), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 84];
In the Australian case Townsend & Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community (1999) 24 Fam LR 495, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 290] negotiation over the course of 12 months was taken to amount to acquiescence but, notably, in the court's exercise of its discretion it decided to make a return order.
Habitual Residence
The interpretation of the central concept of habitual residence (Preamble, Art. 3, Art. 4) has proved increasingly problematic in recent years with divergent interpretations emerging in different jurisdictions. There is a lack of uniformity as to whether in determining habitual residence the emphasis should be exclusively on the child, with regard paid to the intentions of the child's care givers, or primarily on the intentions of the care givers. At least partly as a result, habitual residence may appear a very flexible connecting factor in some Contracting States yet much more rigid and reflective of long term residence in others.
Any assessment of the interpretation of habitual residence is further complicated by the fact that cases focusing on the concept may concern very different factual situations. For example habitual residence may arise for consideration following a permanent relocation, or a more tentative move, albeit one which is open-ended or potentially open-ended, or indeed the move may be for a clearly defined period of time.
General Trends:
United States Federal Appellate case law may be taken as an example of the full range of interpretations which exist with regard to habitual residence.
Child Centred Focus
The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit has advocated strongly for a child centred approach in the determination of habitual residence:
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 125 ALR Fed. 703 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 142]
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/US 935].
See also:
Villalta v. Massie, No. 4:99cv312-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 1999) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 221].
Combined Child's Connection / Parental Intention Focus
The United States Courts of Appeals for the 3rd and 8th Circuits, have espoused a child centred approach but with reference equally paid to the parents' present shared intentions.
The key judgment is that of Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 83].
See also:
Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 530];
Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 879].
In the latter case a distinction was drawn between the situation of very young children, where particular weight was placed on parental intention(see for example: Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 808]) and that of older children where the impact of parental intention was more limited.
Parental Intention Focus
The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 301] has been highly influential in providing that there should ordinarily be a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence before a child can acquire a new one.
This interpretation has been endorsed and built upon in other Federal appellate decisions so that where there was not a shared intention on the part of the parents as to the purpose of the move this led to an existing habitual residence being retained, even though the child had been away from that jurisdiction for an extended period of time. See for example:
Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 777]: United States habitual residence retained after 8 months of an intended 4 year stay in Germany;
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 780]: United States habitual residence retained during 32 month stay in Mexico;
Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp.2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 482]: United States habitual residence retained during 27 month stay in Greece.
The Mozes approach has also been approved of by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd and 7th Circuits:
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 776];
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (2006 7th Cir.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 878].
It should be noted that within the Mozes approach the 9th Circuit did acknowledge that given enough time and positive experience, a child's life could become so firmly embedded in the new country as to make it habitually resident there notwithstanding lingering parental intentions to the contrary.
Other Jurisdictions
There are variations of approach in other jurisdictions:
Austria
The Supreme Court of Austria has ruled that a period of residence of more than six months in a State will ordinarily be characterized as habitual residence, and even if it takes place against the will of the custodian of the child (since it concerns a factual determination of the centre of life).
8Ob121/03g, Oberster Gerichtshof [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/AT 548].
Canada
In the Province of Quebec, a child centred focus is adopted:
In Droit de la famille 3713, No 500-09-010031-003 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 651], the Cour d'appel de Montréal held that the determination of the habitual residence of a child was a purely factual issue to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case with regard to the reality of the child's life, rather than that of his parents. The actual period of residence must have endured for a continuous and not insignificant period of time; the child must have a real and active link to the place, but there is no minimum period of residence which is specified.
Germany
A child centred, factual approach is also evident in German case law:
2 UF 115/02, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 944].
This has led to the Federal Constitutional Court accepting that a habitual residence may be acquired notwithstanding the child having been wrongfully removed to the new State of residence:
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1206/98, 29. Oktober 1998 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 233].
The Constitutional Court upheld the finding of the Higher Regional Court that the children had acquired a habitual residence in France, notwithstanding the nature of their removal there. This was because habitual residence was a factual concept and during their nine months there, the children had become integrated into the local environment.
Israel
Alternative approaches have been adopted when determining the habitual residence of children. On occasion, strong emphasis has been placed on parental intentions. See:
Family Appeal 1026/05 Ploni v. Almonit [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 865];
Family Application 042721/06 G.K. v Y.K. [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 939].
However, reference has been made to a more child centred approach in other cases. See:
decision of the Supreme Court in C.A. 7206/03, Gabai v. Gabai, P.D. 51(2)241;
FamA 130/08 H v H [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 922].
New Zealand
In contrast to the Mozes approach the requirement of a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence was specifically rejected by a majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. See
S.K. v. K.P. [2005] 3 NZLR 590 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NZ 816].
Switzerland
A child centred, factual approach is evident in Swiss case law:
5P.367/2005/ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CH 841].
United Kingdom
The standard approach is to consider the settled intention of the child's carers in conjunction with the factual reality of the child's life.
Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 2]. For academic commentary on the different models of interpretation given to habitual residence. See:
R. Schuz, "Habitual Residence of Children under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: Theory and Practice", Child and Family Law Quarterly Vol 13, No. 1, 2001, p. 1;
R. Schuz, "Policy Considerations in Determining Habitual Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context", Journal of Transnational Law and Policy Vol. 11, 2001, p. 101.