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Case Name

Re KP (A Child) [2014] EWCA 554

INCADAT reference

HC/E/UKe 1258



Court of Appeal (Civil Division)


Appellate Court

Moore-Bick, Black, McFarlane L.JJ.

States involved

Requesting State


Requested State




1 May 2014




Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2) | Procedural Matters



HC article(s) Considered


HC article(s) Relied Upon


Other provisions
Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children who are Subject to Family Proceedings (April 2010)
Authorities | Cases referred to
Re G (Abduction) (Children's Objections) [2010] EWCA Civ 1232, [2011] 1 F.L.R. 1645; Re J (Abduction) (Children's Objections) [2011] EWCA Civ 1448, [2012] 1 F.L.R. 457; Re W (Children) (Family Proceedings: Evidence) [2010] UKSC 12, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 701; Re T (Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2000] 2 F.L.R. 192; Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 A.C. 619; In re H (Abduction) [2007] 1 F.L.R. 242; JPC v SLW and SMW (Abduction) [2007] EWHC 1349 (Fam.), [2007] 2 F.L.R. 900; De L v H [2009] EWHC 3074 (Fam.) [2010] 1 F.L.R. 1229; Re G (Abduction: Children's Objections) [2010] EWCA Civ 1232, [2011] 1F.L.R. 1645; Re J (Abduction: Children's Objections) [2011] EWCA Civ 1448, [2012] 1 F.L.R. 457; Re LC (Children)(Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] UKSC 1, [2014] W.L.R. 124; YLA v PM & MZ [2013] EWHC 3622 (Fam.).

INCADAT comment

Implementation & Application Issues

Procedural Matters
Oral Evidence

Exceptions to Return

Child's Objection
Requisite Age and Degree of Maturity


Summary available in EN | ES


The proceedings concerned a Maltese child born in September 2000. With the exception of two periods of separation, the parents, both Maltese, cohabited from 1999 until April 2013.

On 12 June 2013, the mother brought the child to England, without the knowledge or consent of the father. Mother and child moved in with the maternal grandfather, also a Maltese national.

The father petitioned for the return of the child.

On 5th November 2013, the Family Division of the High Court ordered the return of the child.

On 12 December 2013, the mother was given permission to appeal.


Appeal allowed and case remitted to a different judge of the Family Division of the High Court for re-hearing; the trial judge had erred in the manner in which she had approached her interview with the child, for she had engaged in evidence gathering and then relied upon that evidence in ordering the return of the child.


Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)

Prior to the trial at first instance, the child was interviewed by a specialist officer of the court (CAFCASS officer) and stated that she would not be returning to Malta. She added that she would refuse to board a plane if ordered back. The opinion of the CAFCASS officer was that there should be no order for return.  On the first morning of the trial, it was decided that the child should meet with the judge. After the meeting, the judge concluded that the child was confused and did not have cogent or rational grounds for objecting to a return to Malta.

On appeal, the central submission was that the trial judge had erred in that she had obtained evidence during the meeting with the child and had then relied upon that evidence in reaching her decision to make a return order.

The Court of Appeal referred to the "Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children who are Subject to Family Proceedings" (April 2010) as approved by the then President of the Family Division, and noted that there was "a firm line to be drawn between a process in which the judge and a young person simply encountered each other and communicated in a manner which was not for the purpose of evidence gathering, and a process in which one of the aims of the meeting was to gather evidence". The Court held that the trial judge had fallen on the wrong side of this line.

The Court reviewed existing English authorities on the views of children in abduction proceedings and identified a series of common themes:

"a) There is a presumption that a child will be heard during Hague Convention proceedings, unless this appears inappropriate […];

b) In this context, "hearing" the child involves listening to the child's point of view and hearing what he/she has to say […];

c) The means of conveying a child's views to the court must be independent of the abducting parent […];

d) There are three possible channels through which a child may be heard […]:

  i) Report by a CAFCASS officer or other professional;
  ii) Face to face interview with the judge;
  iii) Child being afforded full party status with legal representation;

e) In most cases an interview with the child by a specialist CAFCASS officer will suffice, but in other cases, especially where the child has asked to see the judge, it may also be necessary for the judge to meet the child. In only a few cases will legal representation be necessary […];

f) Where a meeting takes place it is an opportunity […]:
  i) for the judge to hear what the child may wish to say; and
  ii) for the child to hear the judge explain the nature of the process and, in particular, why, despite hearing what the child may say, the court's order may direct a different outcome;

g) a meeting between judge and child may be appropriate when the child is asking to meet the judge, but there will also be cases where the judge of his or her own motion should attempt to engage the child in the process […]."

Turning to the issue of judges meeting children, and the facts of the appeal, the Court made several points:

i) During a meeting the judge's role should be largely that of a passive recipient of whatever communication the young person wishes to transmit.

ii) The purpose of the meeting is not to obtain evidence and the judge should not, therefore, probe or seek to test whatever it is that the child wishes to say. The meeting is primarily for the benefit of the child. The task of gathering evidence is for the specialist CAFCASS officers.

iii) Where a meeting occurs prior to the judge deciding upon the central issues of the case, it should be for the dual purposes of allowing the judge to hear what the young person may wish to volunteer and for the young person to hear the judge explain the nature of the court process. The length of such a meeting will generally be no more than 20 minutes.

iv) If the child volunteers evidence that would or might be relevant to the outcome of the proceedings, the judge should report back to the parties and determine whether, and if so how, that evidence should be adduced. 

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge in seeking to "probe" the child's wishes and feelings, which she did so over the course of more than an hour by asking 87 questions, went well beyond a passive role and fell into the process of gathering evidence.

The judge had also erred in regarding the meeting as being an opportunity for the child to make representations or submissions. The Court further clarified that the purpose of a judicial meeting was not for the young person to argue his / her case, but to provide an opportunity for the young person to state whatever it is that he / she wishes to state directly to the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's interview provided key evidence upon which she relied in coming to her conclusion. As the material gleaned from the meeting went to the heart of the judge's analysis, that analysis could not stand and must be set aside by allowing the appeal.

Procedural Matters

See above as regards undertakings.

Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy

INCADAT comment

Oral Evidence

To ensure that Convention cases are dealt with expeditiously, as is required by the Convention, courts in a number of jurisdictions have restricted the use of oral evidence, see:

Gazi v. Gazi (1993) FLC 92-341, 16 Fam LR 18; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 277]

It should be noted however that more recently Australia's supreme jurisdiction, the High Court, has cautioned against the ‘inadequate, albeit prompt, disposition of return applications', rather a ‘thorough examination on adequate evidence of the issues' was required, see:

M.W. v. Director-General, Department of Community Services [2008] HCA 12, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 988].

Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigianni (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 456 (C.A.); [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 758].

The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that if credibility was a serious issue, courts should consider hearing viva voce evidence of witnesses whose credibility is in issue.

China - Hong Kong
S. v. S. [1998] 2 HKC 316; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/HK 234];

United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re F. (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 40];

Re W. (Abduction: Procedure) [1995] 1 FLR 878; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 37].

In the above case it was accepted that a situation where oral evidence should be allowed was where the affidavit evidence was in direct conflict.

Re W. (Abduction: Domestic Violence) [2004] EWCA Civ 1366, [2005] 1 FLR 727; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 771]

In the above case the Court of Appeal ruled that a trial judge could consider of his own motion to allow oral evidence where he conceived that oral evidence might be determinative of the case.

However, to warrant oral exploration of written evidence as to the existence of a grave risk of harm which was only embryonic on the written material, a judge must be satisfied that there was a realistic possibility that oral evidence would establish an Article 13(1) b) case.

Re F. (Abduction: Child's Wishes) [2007] EWCA Civ 468, [2007] 2 FLR 697; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 906]

Here the Court of Appeal affirmed that where the exception of acquiescence was alleged oral evidence was more commonly allowed because of the necessity to ascertain the applicant's subjective state of mind, as well as his communications in response to knowledge of the removal or retention.

Supreme Court of Finland: KKO:2004:76; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/FI 839].

In the Matter of M. N. (A Child) [2008] IEHC 382; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 992].

The trial judge noted that applications were heard on affidavit evidence only, except where the Court, in exceptional circumstances, directed or permitted oral evidence.

New Zealand
Secretary for Justice v. Abrahams, ex parte Brown; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 492];

Hall v. Hibbs [1995] NZFLR 762; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 248];

South Africa
Pennello v. Pennello [2003] 1 All SA 716; [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ZA 497];

Central Authority v. H. 2008 (1) SA 49 (SCA); [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ZA 900].

In the above case the Supreme Court of Appeal noted that even where the parties had not requested that oral evidence be admitted, it might be required where a finding on the issue of consent could not otherwise be reached.

United States of America
Ferraris v. Alexander, 125 Cal. App. 4th 1417 (Cal. App. 3d. Dist., 2005); [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USs 797]

The father argued that the trial court denied him a fair hearing because it determined disputed issues of fact without hearing oral evidence from the parties.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission noting that nothing in the Hague Convention entitled the father to an evidentiary hearing with sworn witness testimony. Moreover, it noted that under California law declarations could be used in place of witness testimony in various situations.

The Court further ruled that the father could not question the propriety of the procedure used with regard to evidence on appeal because he did not object to the use of affidavits in evidence at trial.

For a consideration of the use of oral evidence in Convention proceedings see: Beaumont P.R. and McEleavy P.E. 'The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction' OUP, Oxford, 1999 at p. 257 et seq.

Under the rules applicable within the European Union for intra-EU abductions (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels II a)) Convention applications are now subject to additional provisions, including the requirement that an applicant be heard before a non-return order is made [Article 11(5) Brussels II a Regulation], and, that the child be heard ‘during the proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity' [Article 11(2) Brussels II a Regulation].

Requisite Age and Degree of Maturity

Article 13(2) does not include a minimum age from which the objections of a child must be ascertained, rather it employs the formula that the child must have ‘attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.'  Nevertheless it was the intention of the drafters that the exception would be primarily directed towards teenagers who were not prepared to go back to their home State.

Undoubtedly influenced by domestic family law practice, different patterns emerged in Contracting States as to the manner in which this exception has been applied.  Moreover those patterns may have evolved in jurisdictions during the life span of the application of the Convention, particularly as greater recognition has been paid to children as legal actors in their own right.  Indeed in the European Union, at least as regards intra-EU abductions, there is now an obligation that a child is given an opportunity to be heard, unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his age or maturity: Council Regulation 2201/2003, Art. 11(2).

The issue of age and maturity is also closely inter-related with the threshold applied to the exception, that is to say the criteria used to determine the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to take a child's objections into account, see for example: Re T. (Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2000] 2 FLR 192 [INCADAT cite HC/E/UKe 270]; Zaffino v. Zaffino [2006] 1 FLR 410 [INCADAT cite HC/E/UKe 813]; W. v. W. 2004 S.C. 63 IH (1 Div) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 805]; White v. Northumberland [2006] NZFLR 1105, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 902].


H.Z. v. State Central Authority [2006] Fam CA 466, INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 876

8 year old expressed objections which went beyond the mere expression of a preference or of ordinary wishes, however, in the light of her age and degree of maturity it would not be appropriate to take account of her views.

Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v. Thorpe (1997) FLC 92-785 INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 212]

Objections of 9 year old upheld


4 UF 223/98, Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 820]

No fixed age limit.  The 8 year old concerned lacked sufficient maturity.

93 F 178/98 HK, Familengericht Flensburg (Family Court), 18 September 1998, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 325]

Objections of 6 year old gathered, but not upheld. 


In the Matter of M. N. (A Child) [2008] IEHC 382, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 992

Detailed assessment of the age at which the views of a child should be heard in the light of Article 11(2) of the Brussels II a Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003).  Order made that the views of a 6 year old be ascertained.

New Zealand

U. v. D. [2002] NZFLR 529, INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 472

Objections of 7 year old considered, but not upheld.


5P.1/2005 /bnm, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 795

No minimum age.  Children aged 9 1/2 and 10 ½ heard, but their objections were not upheld.

5P.3/2007 /bnm, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 894

A child would have the requisite maturity if he was able to understand the nature of the return proceedings. It was not possible to give general guidance as to the minimum age from which a child would be able to deal with such an abstract issue. The Court noted however that research in the field of child psychology suggested a child would only be capable of such reasoning from the age of 11 or 12.  The court of appeal had therefore been entitled not to gather the views of children, then aged 9 and 7.

United Kingdom - England & Wales

Re W (Minors) [2010] EWCA 520 Civ, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 1324

Objections of siblings aged 8 and almost 6 upheld.

The Court accepted that the objections of a child of 6 falling within the exception would have been outside the contemplation of the drafters.  However, Wilson L.J. held that: "...over the last thirty years the need to take decisions about much younger children not necessarily in accordance with their wishes but at any rate in the light of their wishes has taken hold... ."

United Kingdom - Scotland

N.J.C. v. N.P.C. [2008] CSIH 34, 2008 S.C. 571, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 996

Views of 9 ½ year old not gathered; objections of her 15 and 11 year old siblings not upheld.

W. v. W. 2004 S.C. 63 IH (1 Div) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 805]

9 year old not of sufficient maturity to have her views considered - decision of trial judge reversed.

United States

Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001) INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 585]

No minimum age at which objections of a child can be ascertained.  Objections of 8 year old, within the context of an Art. 13(1)b) assessment, upheld.

Escobar v. Flores 183 Cal. App. 4th 737 (2010), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USs 1026]

No minimum age at which objections of a child can be ascertained.  Objections of 8 year old upheld.


La menor en cuestión, de nacionalidad maltesa, nació en septiembre del 2000. Sus padres convivieron desde 1999 hasta abril del 2013 exceptuando dos periodos de separación.

El 12 de junio de 2013, la madre llevó a la menor a Inglaterra, sin el consentimiento ni el conocimiento del padre. La madre y la menor se mudaron con el abuelo materno, también de nacionalidad maltesa.

El padre solicitó la restitución de la menor.

El 5 de noviembre del 2013, el tribunal de primera instancia en materia de familia de Inglaterra (Family Division of the High Court) ordenó la restitución de la menor.

El 12 de diciembre del 2013, se le dio permiso a la madre para apelar.


Se dio lugar a la apelación y la causa se remitió a un juez diferente del Family Division of the High Court para un nuevo juicio. La jueza de primera instancia había incurrido en error por la forma en que había abordado la entrevista de la menor, ya que había recabado pruebas y luego ordenado la restitución de la menor en base a esas pruebas.


Objeciones del niño a la restitución - art. 13(2)

Antes del juicio de primera instancia, la menor había sido entrevistada por un funcionario especialista del tribunal (un funcionario de CAFCASS (servicio de asistencia jurídica a familias y menores)) y había manifestado que no volvería a Malta. Había agregado que hasta se negaría a subirse al avión si se le ordenaba volver. El primer día del juicio, se decidió que la menor debía entrevistarse con la jueza. Luego del encuentro, la jueza concluyó que la menor estaba confundida y no tenía argumentos racionales ni convincentes para oponerse a regresar a Malta.

En la apelación, el argumento principal fue que la jueza de primera instancia había incurrido en error ya que había obtenido pruebas durante el encuentro con la menor y luego había decidido emitir la orden de restitución en base a esas pruebas.

El tribunal de apelación recurrió a la Guía para jueces que entrevistan a menores en procesos en materia de familia (“Guidelines for Judges Meeting Children who are Subject to Family Proceedings”, abril de 2010) que fue aprobada por el entonces presidente de la Family Division of the High Court, y señaló que: “hay que establecer una distinción clara entre los procesos en los que el juez se encuentra con un menor sin el propósito de obtener pruebas y los procesos donde el objetivo del encuentro sí es la obtención de pruebas”. El tribunal sostuvo que la jueza de primera instancia había caído del lado equivocado de la distinción.

El tribunal revisó jurisprudencia en materia de sustracción de menores e identificó una serie de temas comunes:

“a) Se presume que en los procesos en virtud del Convenio de La Haya se escuchará al niño, excepto que se estime inapropiado […];

b) En este contexto, por “escuchar” al niño se entiende tener en cuenta el punto de vista del niño y escuchar lo que este dice […];

c) Los medios para transmitirle al tribunal las opiniones del menor tienen que ser independientes al padre o la madre sustractor(a) […];

d) Hay tres posibles medios a través de los cuales se escuchará al niño […]:

i) Informes emitidos por un funcionario de CAFCASS u otro profesional;

ii) Entrevistas presenciales entre el juez y el menor;

iii) Si al menor se le atribuye calidad de parte con representación legal;

e) En la mayoría de los casos, la entrevista al menor por parte de los funcionarios de CAFCASS será suficiente, pero en otros casos, en particular aquellos en que el menor haya pedido ver al juez, puede ser necesario que el juez entreviste al menor personalmente. En muy pocos casos es necesario que el menor tenga representación legal […].

f) De haber una entrevista entre el juez y en niño, esta será una oportunidad para […]:

i) que el juez escuche al niño;

ii) que el juez le explique al menor la naturaleza del proceso y, en particular, por qué a pesar de escuchar lo que el niño diga, la orden del tribunal puede ir en otro sentido.

g) La entrevista entre el juez y el niño será apropiada si el niño pide ver al juez, pero también hay ocasiones en que el juez puede decir de oficio entrevistar al niño […];”

Volviendo a la cuestión de la entrevista del juez al menor y los hechos concernientes a la apelación en cuestión, el tribunal señaló los siguientes puntos:

i) Durante la entrevista el rol del juez debe ser mayormente pasivo y debe recibir toda la información que el menor desee transmitir.

ii) El objetivo de la entrevista no es obtener pruebas y el juez no debe indagar o intentar poner a prueba lo que sea que el menor intenta transmitir. El objetivo principal de la entrevista es beneficiar al menor. La obtención de pruebas es tarea de los especialistas de CAFCASS.

iii) Si la entrevista ocurre antes de que el juez decida los temas centrales de la causa, deberá utilizarse para cumplir con los dos objetivos: el de permitirle al juez escuchar al menor y para que el juez le informe al menor la naturaleza del proceso judicial. La duración de la entrevista es, por lo general, menos de 20 minutos.

iv) Si el menor ofrece prueba que sea o pueda ser relevante al resultado del proceso, el juez deberá informar a las partes y determinar si esas pruebas deberían hacerse valer, y en ese caso, de qué manera.

El tribunal de apelación sostuvo que la jueza de primera instancia, en su intento por averiguar los deseos y sentimientos de la menor —para lo que realizó una entrevista de una hora y de 87 preguntas— fue mucho más allá de un rol pasivo y acabó siendo un proceso de obtención de pruebas.

La jueza también incurrió en error con respecto a considerar la entrevista como una oportunidad para que el menor haga declaraciones y presente alegaciones. El tribunal además aclaró que el propósito de una entrevista con el juez no es que el menor presente argumentos en su favor, sino que es una oportunidad para que diga lo que quiera decir directamente al juez.

El tribunal de apelación estimó que la entrevista de la jueza de primera instancia aportó pruebas claves en las cuales se basó a la hora de tomar una decisión. Por esta razón, el análisis carecía de validez y se debía dar lugar a la apelación.

Cuestiones procesales

Autor del sumario: Peter McEleavy

Comentario INCADAT

Prueba presentada oralmente

Para garantizar que los casos tramitados con arreglo al Convenio sean tratados con celeridad, como lo exige el Convenio, los tribunales en varias jurisdicciones han restringido el uso de la prueba testimonial. Véanse:

Gazi v. Gazi (1993) FLC 92-341, 16 Fam LR 18, [Cita INCADAT: HC/E/AU 277]

Debe observarse, sin embargo, que más recientemente la máxima instancia de Australia, la High Court, ha advertido contra la "resolución inadecuada, aunque pronta, de solicitudes de restitución", en cambio se exije un "examen minucioso respecto de las pruebas adecuadas". Véase:

M.W. v. Director-General, Department of Community Services [2008] HCA 12, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/AU 988].

Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigianni (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 456 (C.A.), [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/CA 758]

El Tribunal de Apelaciones de Ontario sostuvo que si la credibilidad era un problema serio, los tribunales debían considerar escuchar las declaraciones de los testigos cuya credibilidad estuviera cuestionada en un procedimiento oral.

China - Hong Kong
S. v. S. [1998] 2 HKC 316, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/HK 234]

Reino Unido - Inglaterra y Gales
Re F. (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 40];

Re W. (Abduction: Procedure) [1995] 1 FLR 878, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 37].

En el caso anteriormente mencionado se aceptó que una situación en la que debería permitirse la prueba testimonial era aquella en la que la prueba documental se encontraba en conflicto directo.

Re W. (Abduction: Domestic Violence) [2004] EWCA Civ 1366, [2005] 1 FLR 727, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 771];

En el caso anterior, el Tribunal de Apelación falló que un juez de primera instancia podría considerar de oficio el permitir la prueba testimonial cuando considerara que la prueba testimonial puede resultar determinante para el caso.

Sin embargo, para garantizar la exploración verbal respecto de la existencia de un grave riesgo de daño que era solo embrionario en la prueba escrita, un juez debía estar convencido de que existía una posibilidad realista de que la prueba testimonial configurara un caso del artículo 13(1)(b).

Re F. (Abduction: Child's Wishes) [2007] EWCA Civ 468, [2007] 2 FLR 697, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/UKe 906];

En este caso el Tribunal de Apelación afirmó que cuando se alegaba la excepción de aceptación posterior, se permitía de manera más general la prueba testimonial debido a la necesidad de asegurar el estado mental subjetivo del solicitante, así como también sus comunicaciones en respuesta al conocimiento del traslado o retención.

Supreme Court of Finland: KKO:2004:76, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/FI 839].

In the Matter of M. N. (A Child) [2008] IEHC 382, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/IE 992].

El juez de primera instancia observó que las solicitudes eran consideradas solo en relación a la prueba documental, excepto cuando el tribunal, en circunstancias excepcionales, ordenaba o permitía la prueba testimonial.

Nueva Zelanda
Secretary for Justice v. Abrahams, ex parte Brown, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/NZ 492];

Hall v. Hibbs [1995] NZFLR 762, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/NZ 248]

Pennello v. Pennello [2003] 1 All SA 716, [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/ZA 497];

Central Authority v. H. 2008 (1) SA 49 (SCA), [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/ZA 900].

En el caso que antecede la Corte Suprema de Apelaciones observó que incluso cuando las partes no habían solicitado que se admitiera la prueba testimonial, esta se podría exigir cuando la cuestión del consentimiento no pudiera resolverse de otro modo. 

Estados Unidos de América
Ferraris v. Alexander, 125 Cal. App. 4th 1417 (Cal. App. 3d. Dist., 2005), [Referencia INCADAT: HC/E/USs 797].

El padre argumentó que el juzgado de primera instancia le había negado una audiencia justa, dado que había determinado los asuntos de hecho en disputa sin escuchar la prueba testimonial de las partes.

El Tribunal de Apelaciones rechazó su planteo, destacando que nada en el Convenio de La Haya da al padre el derecho a una audiencia de prueba con declaración jurada de testigos. También destacó que, de conformidad con la legislación de California, los alegatos podían ser usados en lugar de la declaración testimonial en varias situaciones.

El Tribunal además estableció que el padre no podía cuestionar la procedencia del procedimiento utilizado con relación a la prueba en la apelación, porque no había objetado el uso de declaraciones juradas como prueba en el juicio.

Para la consideración del uso de la prueba testimonial en los procedimientos del Convenio, ver: Beaumont P.R. y McEleavy P.E. 'The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction' OUP, Oxford, 1999 en p. 257 y ss.

En virtud de las normas aplicables en la Unión Europea para las sustracciones entre Estados de la UE (Reglamento del Consejo (CE) Nº 2201/2003 (Bruselas II bis)), las solicitudes en virtud del Convenio actualmente están sujetas a disposiciones adicionales, entre ellas el requisito de que se escuche al solicitante antes de denegar la restitución [artículo 11(5) Reglamento de Bruselas II bis], y, que se escuche al niño "durante el proceso, a menos que esto no se considere conveniente habida cuenta de su edad o grado de madurez' [artículo 11(2) Reglamento de Bruselas II bis].

Edad y grado de madurez requeridos

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